An imminent deal or ‘lies’? Fog of claims and counterclaims shrouds US-Iran war

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LONDON – Iran has gone back on its initial promise to reopen the Strait of Hormuz for international navigation, in a move guaranteed to complicate negotiations to end the war between Iran and the United States and Israel.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi initially announced on April 17 that the waterway, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas is transported, would be “completely open” as long as the current ceasefire between the US and Iran remained in force.

The move was immediately welcomed by US President Donald Trump, who claimed that although the US naval blockade on Iran would continue, the Iranian decision to open the strait was a boost to peace prospects.

“I think we’ll reach an agreement within a day or two,” the US leader told the media, adding that there were “no sticking points” outstanding between the two countries.

Yet optimism was soon dashed, as Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also acts as his country’s chief negotiator, dismissed Mr Trump’s claims about an impending peace deal with the US as “false” and clarified on April 18 that the strait “will not remain open”.

The flurry of contradictory announcements about the fate of the Hormuz passage are an indication of deep divisions within the Iranian leadership about the conduct of the war.

And they also act as a grim reminder of the difficulties of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement between the US and Iran.

Tehran power struggles

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi is speaking for a more moderate wing within the Iranian government, one that is seeking a way out of the current confrontation by offering to open the Hormuz Strait as a prelude for more substantial negotiations with the US.

But it is equally clear that Mr Araghchi remains in a minority and is not a critical decision-maker.

Mr Ghalibaf, Iran’s Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator, easily overturned Mr Araghchi’s decision. And it is notable that a statement issued on the evening of April 18 by Mr Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s newly appointed Supreme Leader, made no mention of Hormuz, let alone hinted at the strait’s opening.

It is also clear that even if some Iranian officials are contemplating the reopening of the waterway, they are determined to do so on Iran’s terms, and not by simply returning to the navigation arrangements that existed before the US and Israel attacked Iran.

All official Iranian statements refer to a reopening that is limited to one shipping lane through Hormuz, and one that hugs the Iranian coastline. Before the latest war, most cargo ships and oil tankers sailed farther south, through shipping lanes close to the Gulf Arab monarchy of Oman.

There are also reports that Iran intends to limit the number of tankers which can pass each day.

Iran’s apparent insistence on continuing to direct the seaborne traffic remains unacceptable to other Gulf states because it implies Iranian control over what is an international waterway.

And there are indications that Iran also intends to continue levying a fee on every passing tanker – yet again something neither the US nor any Middle Eastern government will accept.

Release of frozen funds for freezing nuclear programme?

Beyond this, the fog of claims and counterclaims about what the US and Iran could agree on is getting only more impenetrable.

Mr Trump continues to insist that, as a precondition for removing the threat of further US air strikes, Iran must agree to dismantle its nuclear programme and hand over its estimated 440kg of highly enriched uranium. This remains, US Vice-President J.D. Vance said when he conducted direct talks with Iranian leaders in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on April 11, a “red line” for Washington.

Reports from sources close to the White House suggest that Mr Trump may offer the Iranians a financial inducement in return for handing over the uranium; around US$20 billion (S$25.4 billion) worth of Iranian funds currently frozen in various bank accounts around the world is allegedly on offer.

Mr Trump has formally denied that such a deal is in the offing, and for good reason. Since he launched his bid for the US presidency more than a decade ago, he has constantly attacked former president Barack Obama for agreeing to give Iran US$1.7 billion of its frozen funds in 2016 in return for a deal freezing Iran’s nuclear programme.

The US airlifted part of that money to Iran in crates of cash, something Mr Trump claimed was proof of Mr Obama’s inability to negotiate a “smart deal” with the Iranians. It is therefore likely that, even if the US now agrees to hand over money in return for an agreement over nuclear material, that won’t be an explicit deal, if only to save Mr Trump’s face.

Will Trump betray Netanyahu?

Beyond that, there is the question of Israel. There is no doubt that the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah – the Iranian-funded militia in Lebanon – which came into effect on April 16 represents a diplomatic victory for Iran.

The Iranians have long insisted that no ceasefire can continue between themselves and the US unless it also includes Lebanon, which the Israelis invaded on March 13, intending to destroy Hezbollah bases.

Initially, both the US and Israel rejected this Iranian demand, claiming that the two conflicts are quite different. But Mr Trump suddenly reversed his stance, telling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop fighting.

The shift shocked the Israeli government; the mass-circulation Yedioth Ahronoth daily newspaper in Tel Aviv reported that Israeli leaders described Mr Trump’s action as a “betrayal”, and claimed that it supposedly condemned Israel to “waiting for the next massacre” from Hezbollah.

For Mr Netanyahu, the US-imposed ceasefire in Lebanon is thoroughly bad news at two levels. First, the US now explicitly accepts that Iran should act as a protector of Hezbollah, and that the security of Lebanon is a matter of concern for Iran, something no previous US administration ever publicly admitted.

And, second, Mr Trump’s message to Mr Netanyahu to stop fighting was delivered in a humiliating manner, leaving no doubt that it was an order, rather than a request. “Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are prohibited from doing so by the USA,” Mr Trump wrote on Truth Social, his preferred social media platform.

Israel had no choice but to comply. But Mr Netanyahu remains determined to regain the political initiative, so he can be relied upon to do everything possible to derail the diplomatic feelers between the US and Iran, either by resuming the war in Lebanon, or by using all his influence in Washington to prevent any meaningful US concessions.

None of this precludes the continuation of diplomatic contacts between the US and Iran. Intensive talks about reopening the strait are continuing, and the offer of renewed talks between the US and Iran in Islamabad remains on the table.

Yet at least for the moment, talk of further warfighting is back on the agenda. President Trump is warning that he may end the ceasefire with Iran if no diplomatic deal is reached by April 22, threatening that the US could then “start dropping bombs again”.

And even if the current ceasefire is extended, prospects of an all-out peace deal between Iran and the US remain very slim.

The US is unlikely to give Iran a guarantee of no future military attacks.

Iran is unlikely to agree to a complete ban on its nuclear efforts. An Iran destroyed by US military strikes is unlikely to suddenly turn into a cooperative Middle Eastern actor. And the Arab states of the Gulf are unlikely to forget what Iran did to them during the latest war.