Hegseth hails Asian partners for boosting security spending; omits Taiwan in roll call

SINGAPORE – The United States has pledged to prioritise working with “model allies” that have risen to its call for a more equitable sharing of the security burden globally.

Lauding the response of Indo-Pacific partners to the Donald Trump administration’s expectation that they spend 3.5 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence expenditure, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reiterated that sustainable alliances are based on a convergence of national interests.

“For those nations that rise to this challenge, that embrace responsibility as true partners, the benefits will be clear,” Mr Hegseth said in his address on May 30 at the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue, a leading security forum focused on the Asia-Pacific organised by London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

“As our strategy states, we will prioritise working with model allies, those nations who are most capable, clear-eyed and ready to defend their national interests,” he added.

“For those nations, we are moving them to the front of the line: expedited arms sales, deep industrial base collaboration, expanded intelligence sharing.”

Mr Hegseth listed Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam among those that are stepping up. Taiwan and New Zealand were not mentioned.

While he referred to “allies” and “partners” interchangeably in his address, only Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand count as Washington’s treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific.

His comments on Japan appear to be more nuanced. While Tokyo is fundamentally overhauling its post-war defence architecture – including relaxing restrictions on defence exports – its defence spending is still just shy of 2 per cent.

“We have high expectations for our Japanese allies,” Mr Hegseth said. “We are not at the finish line yet, and there is still some heavy lifting ahead, but the momentum is headed in the right direction.”

Mr Hegseth struck a more conciliatory tone towards China than that at 2025’s forum.

His address at the current forum is the first major US defence policy speech after the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and American President Donald Trump in Beijing two weeks ago, where they agreed on a new framework of “constructive strategic stability” between the world’s two largest economies.

“What we seek – and what the President has constantly articulated – is a genuinely stable equilibrium that works for Americans and our allies, a favourable but durable balance of power in which no state, including China, can impose its hegemony and hold the security or prosperity of our nation and our allies in question,” Mr Hegseth said on May 30. He stressed that America will act with “strong, quiet and clear” actions to foster stability in the region.

The Taiwan issue

Some Asian delegates from countries that were cited breathed a sigh of relief. One from the Philippines quipped to another from Japan: “We were mentioned.”

But Taiwan’s former defence minister Andrew Yang noted the omission of the island, saying that it is clear the question of the US’ support for Taiwan can be answered only by President Trump. “What can you do about it?”

While Mr Hegseth side-stepped a question from the floor on arms sales to Taiwan, he said New Zealand is “free-loading”, even as its newly appointed Defence Minister Chris Penk previously indicated there were plans to lift defence spending to 2 per cent.

After the recent Beijing summit with his Chinese counterpart, Mr Trump added to uncertainty when he said he was unsure if he would approve what would have been the largest arms sale to Taiwan, the self-governing island that is a major security flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific and US-China ties.

Republican Senator Pete Ricketts told The Straits Times the pending arms sale tranche worth US$14 billion (S$18 billion) is not a “big worry” for now.

“We have got to remember that President Trump made a very strong statement last year with the US$11 billion arms sales,” he said, referring to a deal that was approved at the end of 2025. “And we are behind in delivering our arms to Taiwan.”

The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in 1979, mandates the US to provide the island with the resources required for its effective self-defence.

Mr Trump’s transactionalism in prioritising trade negotiations with China has left some of the US’ largest partners in the Asia-Pacific worried that Taiwan would be relegated in importance.

This uncertainty was initially fanned by Mr Trump’s public silence after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told Parliament in November that any Chinese attack on Taiwan that threatens Japan would justify a military response – enraging Beijing and triggering a major diplomatic dispute between the two neighbours.

Under the Trump administration, the US is demanding allies take more responsibility for their security needs. Its defence strategy is premised on defending the US, with a focus on dominating the Western Hemisphere and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

The Trump administration’s 2026 national defence strategy document stood out for wording that appears to be softer in tone on China.

Durable partnerships

Still, on May 30, Mr Hegseth appeared to signal that the US is cognisant of the national interests of smaller partners in the Indo-Pacific, a term the Americans use to refer to nations around the Indian and Pacific oceans.

“Alliances only work when they are true partnerships. It is a two-way street,” he said. “We are ready to work with all of you, where you are, based on your situation, your own geography and your own cultural, political and economic realities, to ensure that a Pacific free of any dominant hegemon is secured.”

Many countries in Asia, though, have been disproportionately affected by the Trump administration’s Operation Epic Fury against Iran, as they receive the vast majority of the crude oil and liquefied natural gas produced in the Persian Gulf.

Despite claiming to eschew “forever wars”, the Trump administration – along with Israel – attacked Iran from end-February, ostensibly to neutralise Tehran’s offensive capabilities.

Washington expected to be able to extricate its forces from the region expeditiously – like it did in Venezuela after arresting then President Nicolas Maduro in its quest to effect regime change, but Iran turned out to be a more formidable foe with its resistance.

Tehran has effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz, a choke point through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil and natural gas flowed before the conflict.

While an Iran peace agreement appears imminent, the impact of energy scarcity on the cost of living in many parts of the world points to the growing interrelation of security and economic issues.

Another development on the sidelines of this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue further underscores the complexities of contemporary security threats and the layers of alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Flanked by his counterparts from Britain and Australia at the local American embassy later on May 30, Mr Hegseth announced that the US, Britain and Australia are working together to develop unmanned undersea vehicles as part of their trilateral AUKUS defence partnership aimed at countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The programme is a boost for ​the so-called “Pillar Two” project under AUKUS that focuses on the joint development of frontier defence technology, such as that which leverages artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, and hypersonic, advanced cyber and undersea capabilities.

The “first pillar” involves equipping Australia with conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines that are projected to eventually cost Canberra hundreds of billions of dollars, while also involving rotational deployments of UK and US submarines to Australia.

Ultimately with China, Mr Hegseth said the Trump administration is seeking to avoid “needless confrontation” and “always negotiating from a position of unquestionable strength” – with the help of like-minded partners and allies that bear their share of the security burden.

“When our interests align, we act together with focused resolve. When our interests diverge, we adjust pragmatically without the drama or moralising,” he said.