News analysis
Acid attack on activist becomes battleground in Indonesia’s military-police rivalry
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Activists from the Advocacy Team for Democracy hold up posters in support of Mr Andrie Yunus, the victim of the acid attack, at a press conference in Menteng, Central Jakarta, on March 16.
PHOTO: COURTESY OF THE INDONESIA LEGAL AID FOUNDATION
- The Jakarta Police and the Indonesian Military announced conflicting findings regarding the acid attack on rights activist Andrie Yunus, highlighting the rivalry between the two institutions.
- The rivalry stems from the post-Soeharto era division, differing presidential relations, and competition over resources, potentially undermining civilian control and democratic reforms.
- Civil society calls for an independent investigation into the attack, while President Prabowo considers it, emphasizing the need for impartiality amid concerns about institutional bias.
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JAKARTA – Almost a week after an acid attack on Indonesian rights activist Andrie Yunus, the Jakarta police held a press conference to announce that it had identified two suspects.
“We believe that those two people, based on National Police data, have the initials BHC and MAK,” said criminal investigation director, Senior Commander Iman Imanuddin, at the police headquarters in South Jakarta on March 18, without elaborating.
At almost the same time, the Indonesian military told journalists at its headquarters in East Jakarta that it had detained four military personnel suspected of being involved in the attack.
The suspects were Captain NDB, First Lieutenant SL, First Lieutenant BHW, and Second Sergeant ES, said military police commander, Major-General Yusri Nuryanto. All four were members of the Strategic Intelligence Agency, he added.
These seemingly conflicting findings, presented almost simultaneously, mark another chapter of the longstanding rivalry between the military and the police, two of the most powerful institutions in Indonesia.
Analysts said the apparent competition bodes poorly for the investigation and the future of Indonesia’s democracy.
Amid the competing narratives, the military announced on March 25 that Lieutenant-General Yudi Abrimantyo, the Strategic Intelligence Agency chief, had stepped down in a gesture of responsibility for the attack, although he was not among the four suspects.
Shifting sands
The rivalry between the military and the police goes back nearly three decades.
It started when the two institutions were separated after the fall of former president Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. Before that, both were part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). Under the “dwifungsi” or dual-function doctrine, they wielded outsized political influence, including having a significant number of Parliament seats reserved for ABRI personnel.
Since then, there has been much debate over how authority should be divided between the two forces. The democratic reforms and desire for civilian supremacy after 1998 resulted in increased power for the police, and diminished influence for the military. The National Police chief, for example, reports directly to the president, unlike the military, which is under the Ministry of Defence.
The rivalry has intensified over the past decade, driven in part by the differing backgrounds of the two most recent presidents, analysts told The Straits Times.
“The rivalry can be seen in how they compete to purchase weapons, in clashes between forces on the ground and even the size of their budgets,” said Jakarta State University political analyst Ubedilah Badrun.
Former president Joko Widodo, the only civilian to have been elected president in a direct vote, fostered close relations with the police. He appointed many active and former police officers in strategic positions across ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises. Current National Police chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo, for instance, previously served as his aide de camp.
In contrast, current President Prabowo Subianto is a former army general who loves to emphasise his military background and counts several military men among his close advisers. In 2025, he signed a revised Military Law, which many activists and observers fear could lead to a return of dwifungsi.
“The problem is not only in how the law expands the role of the military, but also in how it weakens civilian control over military operations,” defence and security researcher Diandra Mengko of the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) told ST.
The law has drawn criticism from human rights circles. Mr Andrie, the victim of the acid attack, is an outspoken opponent. The deputy coordinator of human rights watchdog Kontras had recorded a podcast about remilitarisation shortly before he was attacked on March 12.
A tug of war
Visiting fellow Made Supriatma from the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore said the latest sign of rift between the two institutions stems from the military’s desire to control the narrative over the attack.
Even before the military press conference, there was speculation – both on social media and among civil society – that the attackers were affiliated with the military.
“The police know that civil society knows (who the attackers are) and does not want to look like fools. So they have been relatively open with civil society on this case and have provided them with a lot of information about the investigation,” Mr Made told ST.
“The military does not want to lose control over the narrative and potentially further damage its image, so it announced its own suspects before the police could.”
Ms Diandra said the military seemed intent on handing the suspects through its internal mechanisms, in contradiction of the Military Law.
“The Military Law emphasises that soldiers should be subject to the general criminal justice system when they are involved in general crimes, and the acid attack case is clearly a general crime,” she said.
“The fact that the military is clearly angling for the suspects to be handled by the military police and military courts is worrying because military courts have a track record of institutional bias.”
Mr Ubedilah said the conflicting narratives reflected poorly on both institutions.
“It shows that they are both being unprofessional and are more concerned with jockeying with each other than with uncovering who is behind the acid attack.”
Dangerous game
Mr Made said civil society has the chance to take advantage of the rift between the military and the police, as both may continue to jostle for control of the narrative.
However, he warned that it is a dangerous position: “It is very important that civil society does not seem to be too much on the side of the police or too anti-military. And there is a real risk that they could be misled by information from either side.”
Mr Ubedilah struck a darker note, saying that the attack – and the rivalry around it – lays bare the threat that the two institutions pose to Indonesia’s democracy if they are not held in check.
“Both institutions share a repressive and coercive nature against civilians. This is evident in the acid attack carried out by active police officers against KPK investigator Novel Baswedan and the acid attack carried out by active military officers against human rights activist Andrie Yunus,” he said.
Mr Novel, then a Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) senior investigator, was attacked in April 2017 by two men on a motorcycle who sprayed acid on his face. The attackers were later identified as police officers, who were eventually sentenced to jail.
For the attack on Mr Andrie, civil society groups have called for an independent fact-finding team to investigate. In a statement on March 18, a group of 227 civil society organisations and 140 individuals, including Kontras and Amnesty International Indonesia, said that such a team was crucial to ensure a “transparent, impartial, and accountable process”.
President Prabowo said on March 17 in a discussion with journalists and experts at his private residence in Hambalang, West Java, that he would consider forming an independent team to investigate the case “as long as it’s truly independent, not just made up of NGOs that already hate the government”.
Mr Khoirul Anam, a doctoral candidate in political science at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia, told ST the March 17 discussion did not address one sensitive subject: debate over the role of the military in domestic counter-terrorism operations.
The debate has been revived following the circulation of a draft presidential regulation in January that would give the military authority over prevention, enforcement and recovery from terrorism.
In a paper written in early March, Mr Khoirul noted that one key difference between the two institutions is that the police are strictly bound by legal proof and procedural rules, while the military is driven by a doctrine on neutralising threats.
“In the legal model, terrorism is addressed through investigation, evidence and trial, while in the war model, threats are enemies to be neutralised,” he wrote in the paper co-authored with Dr Muhammad Syauqillah, head of terrorism studies at the University of Indonesia.
The paper said the current terrorism threat landscape in Indonesia appears well-contained within the existing legal framework, showing little sign of escalating into the kind of armed rebellion that would require military deployment.
“The country’s anti-terror police squad Detachment 88 continues to function effectively and major networks have been dismantled without large-scale military deployment. The law-based approach remains relevant,” the authors argued.
Additional reporting by Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja


