Why Iran’s fate lies in the hands of its Revolutionary Guards

TEHRAN - The US and Israeli air strikes that

killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

, have created the biggest power vacuum since the country’s 1979 revolution.

A temporary council has been appointed to assume his duties, but the real power over Iran’s future rests with the

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

.

The Guards – separate from Iran’s regular military – preside over a vast empire that spans the country’s defence establishment. They shape military policy and command their own missile and naval forces, as well as key cyber operations, in addition to overseeing construction and critical infrastructure through their powerful engineering arm. They control transport hubs and wield enormous influence in the energy sector, serving as a key broker for buyers of Iran’s sanctioned oil.

Mr Khamenei maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with the IRGC, relying on it to secure his grip on power while ensuring its loyalty. Now, with him gone, the group is poised to determine not only who replaces him – but whether the Islamic Republic survives, and what form it takes next.

What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? 

Decades of Western sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, along with its hardening during the 1980 to 1988 war with Iraq, accelerated the IRGC’s evolution from a military branch created to protect the revolution and the system that emerged from it into a gargantuan economic and political force.

Importantly, the IRGC is not a single entity. Some factions are more militaristic and ideological, adamant that the Islamic Republic must not negotiate with the US – the “Great Satan” – while others are more pragmatic, willing to contemplate anything that preserves the IRGC’s privileged position within the system. 

The group has around 200,000 active troops, according to US assessments, and another 600,000 volunteers, including the Basij paramilitary militia. But that does not come close to capturing the reach of the organisation, whose former members permeate nearly every aspect of Iranian society.

While the Guards have the greatest capacity to steer the system’s survival – they are ubiquitous, armed, and well funded – they are also the group with the most to lose if the system falls. 

Who might emerge to fill the power vacuum?

There is no shortage of strongmen within the IRGC’s current and former ranks. Its veterans run the most sensitive parts of Iran’s military, from ballistic missiles to drones, to the nuclear programme that has put Tehran at odds with the West for decades. Many also hold prominent political roles, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and national security chief Ali Larijani.

Other senior surviving figures include President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf. There is no word from Ayatollah Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, who is considered a potential successor to his father.

A strongman – or a collective leadership of them – could seek to consolidate power, potentially sidelining or weakening the role of the next supreme leader. To survive and stave off unrest, any new leadership would have to address the grievances that drove people to protest in the weeks before the attacks, starting with inflation running at more than 40 per cent and a currency that has lost more than half its value in the past year.

How does succession work?

A temporary leadership council comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, the head of the judiciary and a senior cleric, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, has taken over the supreme leader’s duties until the appointment of a successor. Responsibility for choosing the next leader falls to a clerical body called the Assembly of Experts, whose members are elected by public vote – albeit only after vetting by another, unelected body, the Guardian Council. It is not yet clear when the Assembly of Experts will meet.

The speed with which Mr Khamenei’s death was announced suggests either that it was impossible to conceal or that a successor may already have been selected behind the scenes, said professor of government Mehran Kamrava from Georgetown University in Qatar.

Could a potential leader emerge from outside the country?

External opposition figures are few and deeply divisive. Every attempt at building a grassroots movement from within the country has been quashed by the government. The chances of an exile figure taking power appear remote, analysts have indicated. 

Mr Reza Pahlavi, the former crown prince of Iran and son of the deposed shah, emerged during recent protests as a rallying symbol for some and helped draw thousands into the streets in early January. But he remains a polarising figure inside Iran because many people associate him with his family’s pre-revolution monarchy and question whether his return would deliver meaningful change, rather than just revive an old elite. Whether he would have support abroad also matters, since outside backing – especially from the US – could bolster his legitimacy, or reinforce perceptions that his appeal depends on foreign influence rather than domestic legitimacy.

Dr Trita Parsi, executive vice-president of foreign policy think-tank Quincy Institute, has said it is more likely that factions from within the regime would take over and they could well be more hardline.

Would the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps actually want to govern?

After watching Lebanon’s Hezbollah struggle to transition from armed militia into a formal governing force, the IRGC may have little appetite for taking direct control. 

Governing would saddle it with responsibility for Iran’s overlapping economic, political, social and environmental crises, forcing it to make tough choices that it is loath to make. That is a far cry from its current privileged position as a dominant political and military actor that wields influence from the shadows and acts as a power broker for an economy the World Bank values at about US$475 billion (S$603 billion).

What we do know is that the IRGC is not a clerical body. Its leaders might be willing to contemplate limited social reforms, such as easing restrictions on women. But that could come at the expense of civil liberties and political freedoms, which could be further curtailed with less tolerance for protests, tighter internet controls and harsher penalties for dissent as they consolidate their grip on power. Abroad, they would likely move to rebuild and strengthen their regional proxy networks. BLOOMBERG