Why Iran faced Israel and the US alone as its friends stood by

TEHRAN - Iran spent decades expanding its reach in the Middle East by building a network of partners that came to be known as the “axis of resistance”.

Yet it found itself standing alone to face the recent attacks by Israel, which the

US joined by bombing three of the Islamic Republic’s key nuclear facilities.

A tentative ceasefire with Israel went into effect on June 24. 

The web of partnerships that Iran has funded and armed for years is struggling, and the country’s state ally, the regime of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad, fell in December 2024.

Nearly two years of war with Israel has weakened the Palestinian group Hamas and the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah.

And while the Houthi militants in Yemen remain defiant, their capabilities have also been impaired by American strikes. 

Iran has been building ties elsewhere. It has shifted closer to Russia and China, and mended relations with its Gulf Arab rivals for regional power, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Hezbollah

Hezbollah, Iran’s main regional partner, stayed out of the latest conflict between Iran and Israel. The Shi’ite Muslim group, which is both a militia and a political party, is trying to figure out its own next steps.

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon – a region Israel went on to occupy for 18 years.

The group’s leadership and capabilities have been weakened by Israeli strikes – a response to Hezbollah launching a rocket campaign on Israel in support of Gaza, following the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct 7, 2023.

While Hezbollah still retains some fighting capacity, Israel says it has taken out 70 per cent of the group’s arsenal, including rockets and missiles, a claim that is difficult to verify.

Even if Hezbollah were better positioned to assist Iran, there is a question of motivation. There is resentment among some members over how Iran appeared to abandon them during the fight with Israel.

In addition, there is war fatigue among Hezbollah’s constituents. Areas under its control have borne the brunt of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon and many people have lost their homes and possessions.

While Iran gives Hezbollah free rein to make its own strategic calculations, it works closely with the group and has influence with it.

At the same time, knowing how delicate the relationship is with Hezbollah now, the authorities in Iran are likely to hesitate before calling on the group to join their battles.

The Houthis

The Houthis also stuck to the sidelines during the latest Israel-Iran flare-up, although they appeared more willing to get involved, if needed. 

The group first arose during Yemen’s civil war in the 1990s and today controls approximately one-third of the country’s territory, including the capital Sana’a.

The Houthis targeted Israel with missiles and drones and launched a maritime campaign harassing ships in the Red Sea in support of the Palestinians after Oct 7, 2023. The group receives some help and support from Iran without taking direct orders from it.

The Houthis have been hurt by US strikes on its targets, which escalated in March. While the group retains robust capabilities, some of its weapons, including those that allowed it to conduct cross-border and precision attacks, were taken out.

There is also a question of incentive with them. The Houthis are a local group with local grievances that aims to be seen as an actor in its own right, rather than as an Iranian proxy.

They view themselves as active in the fight for Gaza – and have popular support for this – but that does not necessarily extend to Iran. The Houthis also have their hands full with governance and economic challenges that have produced rising discontent in the areas they control.

Hamas

Hamas remains resolved to continue fighting Israel, but after almost two years of war, it lacks the capacity to pose a credible threat on Iran’s behalf.

Also, Hamas is not as close to Iran as other members of the axis of resistance.

The group – which, like Hezbollah and the Houthis, is classified as a terrorist organisation by the US – receives funding and military assistance from Iran, as well as financial support from Qatar, but does not always follow orders or calls for restraint.

The relationship between Hamas and Iran is more a marriage of convenience rather than a close partnership.

Iraq’s Shi’ite militias

Iran has traditionally relied on Shi’ite militias in Iraq known as the Hashd al Shaabi, or Popular Mobilisation Forces, to confront the US presence there.

The Hashd emerged in 2014 after the radical Sunni group Islamic State took over large swathes of Iraq, and the country’s highest ranking Shi’ite cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on Shi’ites to join the security forces to push back against the threat.

While the Hashd is no monolith – a wide array of views and relationships are represented – its components receive arms, money and close guidance from Iran.

Iran-backed militias have periodically attacked US military personnel remaining in Iraq, who number some 2,500.

But Hezbollah’s recent experience of being battered and getting no help from Iran is a cautionary tale. When Iran on June 23 retaliated against the US attack on its nuclear facilities two days earlier, it chose a US base in Qatar as its main target, rather than Iraq.  

Syria

Syria, under the Assad regime, became the state closest to Iran after its Islamic revolution in 1979.

Assad’s fall was a surprise to many, including the authorities in Iran.

They took no measures to stop it, and instead turned their back on Assad in the hope that they could build at least basic ties with the next government.

But Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa appears to have other priorities, including strengthening ties with the US and its allies, and courting the Gulf Arab states in the pursuit of economic dividends to help him build his constituency and overcome his difficulty controlling all of Syria.

In the pursuit of a “no problems with neighbours’ policy”, he went so far as to barely respond to Israeli strikes on Syria and to allow Israel to use his country’s airspace in its campaign against Iran.

The Gulf Arab states

While Iran has had good ties with the Gulf Arab states Oman and Qatar, its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE were tumultuous until recently. 

The latter two encouraged US President Donald Trump’s efforts to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran during his first term.

But they were disappointed with what they perceived to be a US failure to react to attacks on Saudi oil installations in 2019 and on the UAE in 2022 that they ultimately held Iran responsible for.

Afterward, they both began to pursue de-escalation with Iran, arguing that containment would work only if it was combined with engagement.

In 2022, the UAE restored normal diplomatic relations with Iran, and Saudi Arabia followed the next year. 

But this olive branch from Saudi Arabia and the UAE will extend only so far, given that good relations with the US, their main security guarantor, is also critical to them.

In addition, some of the ruling elites in the two countries privately welcomed Israel’s attacks on Iranian leaders, even if others were more fearful of what might come next.  

All in all, the only support Gulf Arab states gave Iran in the June conflict was strong words of condemnation for Israel, calls for a return to peace and offers to mediate.

Russia and China

Smarting from the West’s ability to isolate it in the 2010s, Iran set out to build closer ties with both Russia and China, and succeeded.

Russia’s own fallout with the US and its allies over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine helped draw it closer to Iran, which supplied the Russian military with drones for the war.

And, as part of its rivalry with the US, China tends to present itself as a defender of countries, such as Iran, that are in conflict with the other superpower.

Both Russia and China strongly condemned the Israeli and US strikes on Iran, and Russia offered to mediate to de-escalate tensions.

But neither country offered Iran tangible assistance. While Iran has a 20-year strategic partnership with Russia and a 25-year cooperation deal with China, these arrangements are not formal alliances.

Officials in Russia, who are already mired in the war in Ukraine, made it clear that their agreement with Iran does not include mutual-defence obligations. 

China, which imports much of its oil from Iran, has cause to worry about the flow of energy from the region, and therefore an incentive to encourage an end to any hostilities that would disrupt its crude supply and prompt Iran to curb access to the Strait of Hormuz – a key shipping choke point located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf that handles about a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade.

However, for Russia, a major oil exporter, instability in the region leading to higher oil prices could be an economic boon. BLOOMBERG