Turkey enjoys temporary triumph after Syrian government falls to opposition insurgents

BRUSSELS – “It’s finally up to the people of Syria to shape their future,” Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Dec 8, hours after the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown. It is also believed, however, that no other state is better positioned to benefit from the upheavals than Turkey.

Few people know the Middle East better than Mr Fidan. Before his appointment in 2023 as Turkey’s top diplomat, Mr Fidan ran his country’s National Intelligence Organisation – Turkey’s chief spying outfit – for more than a decade, and remains one of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s closest advisers.

In his first public reaction to the spectacular events in Syria, Mr Fidan was, however, uncharacteristically modest. While there is no doubt that he genuinely wants Syria to get back on its feet without foreign interference, Turkey is now the country with the greatest influence over Syrian affairs.

At the same time, no other nation stands to lose more from any potential Syrian mayhem than Turkey. Mr Erdogan and his chief spook like to play for high stakes.

After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Mr Erdogan pursued two policy goals in Syria.

He wanted to create the conditions for the return of Syrian refugees who poured into Turkey. The Turks now host approximately three million Syrian citizens, and the refugee question has been one of the most divisive domestic issues in the country, especially since the Turkish economy has experienced a downturn over the past few years.

Just as importantly, Mr Erdogan aimed to prevent the creation of a Kurdish-dominated autonomous region in northern Syria adjacent to the Turkish borders.

This is seen in Turkey as a dangerous move, apt to encourage separatist tendencies among the country’s own Kurds, who number around 15 million, or approximately 18 per cent of the Turkish population.

The government in Ankara, the Turkish capital, views the so-called People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the most important Kurdish armed organisation in Syria – as its lethal enemy. The Turkish military has conducted several ground offensives against the militia since 2016 and have deployed troops inside parts of Syria for years.

As late as 2023, Mr Erdogan still hoped to resolve both the refugee and YPG problems in a political deal with then Syria ruler Assad.

But Mr Assad insisted that he would not make any concessions until Turkey withdrew its forces from Syria, a precondition the Turks always dismissed as unacceptable.

As long as Russia and Iran actively supported Mr Assad, the Syrian leader was largely protected from Turkish pressure.

In 2018, Russia intervened to curb Turkish influence in northern Syria. And in 2020, the Russian Air Force went as far as bombing a Turkish military convoy in Syria for similar reasons.

However, Mr Erdogan was the first to realise that Mr Assad’s international supporters were seriously weakened and, therefore, no longer able to sustain the Syrian regime.

Israel, during its recent war in Lebanon, destroyed Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed militia that supplied Mr Assad with soldiers. And Russia’s military was too over-stretched in Ukraine to prop up Mr Assad.

So, instead of merely negotiating concessions from Mr Assad, Turkey opted for the Syrian ruler’s removal.

Officially, Turkey continues to present itself as an impartial observer in the Syrian drama.

However, it is undisputed that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist group instrumental in Mr Assad’s overthrow, could hardly have prepared and carried out its offensive without Turkey’s explicit support.

The Idlib region in north-western Syria, the stronghold of HTS, is supplied almost exclusively via Turkey.

Nor is it the only Turkish-sponsored actor inside Syria, for the Turks exert even stronger control over the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) – another militia – now conducting its own offensives targeting Kurdish forces.

However, compared with HTS and its allies, the SNA’s importance in the current fighting is secondary.

The lightning speed of Mr Assad’s overthrow places Turkey in pole position in the Middle East and enhances Mr Erdogan’s reputation as an accomplished and wily strategist.

Both Iran and Russia now need Turkey more than Turkey needs them.

The Iranians are keen to preserve some of their influence inside Syria and perhaps recover some of the US$50 billion (S$67 billion) of debt Syria owes Iran for decades of economic assistance and supplies of cheap Iranian oil.

The Russians are desperate to keep their naval and air bases on Syrian soil.

Turkey is the only country that can promise help on both counts.

Furthermore, the strategic breakthrough in Syria enhances Mr Erdogan’s leverage with Turkey’s Western partners.

The most urgent concern for Western governments now is to ensure that a radical Islamist regime does not take over Syria. Turkey’s influence over HTS is vital to this objective.

US President-elect Donald Trump is also keen to pull out the 900-odd American special forces stationed in Syria, and Washington may well rely on Turkey to fill that void.

All the Arab governments in the Middle East now look to Turkey for help in managing domestic Syrian developments, which, if they go wrong, can destabilise the entire region. Mr Erdogan is at the peak of his powers and influence.

However, the Turkish leader is also facing significant dangers.

The first is a familiar problem for Mr Erdogan: hubris, or the risk of over-promising and under-delivering.

Turkey is the leading outside political actor in Syria. Still, it is not the only actor, and once HTS and other militias consolidate their hold over Syria, they will not need to listen to Turkey as much as they do now.

Turkey’s overweening presence is also resented by many Arabs, who were ruled for centuries by the Ottoman Empire, of which Turkey is the main successor.

Mr Erdogan is famously tone-deaf regarding this historic resistance to Turkish influence in the Middle East.

And Turkey’s ability to pick and choose its allies inside Syria is nowhere near as great as Mr Erdogan believes.

If Turkey wants to solve its Syrian refugee crisis, it needs a stable and functioning Syrian state run by a government that enjoys the support of all Syrian ethnic and religious groups, including Syria’s Kurds.

And this may mean ignoring Turkey’s priorities.

Still, for now, Turkey and its diplomats are savouring their success.

And Mr Erdogan is eagerly scanning the Middle Eastern landscape for his next opportunity.