In the line of fire, Iran hits back – but also exposes its weaknesses

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As the war in the Middle East enters its third day, Iran has surprised most political observers with its defence capabilities. Iran’s Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and most of his Defence Council are dead

, yet the country not only continues to function, but is also successfully lashing out at its attackers.

Israel has suffered its single-highest casualty rate in its current war with Iran, after a single Iranian missile slammed into the city of Beth Shemesh, killing eight civilians and wounding a further two dozen.

Gulf states continue to be hit by Iran’s advanced ballistic missiles as well. And navigation in the Strait of Hormuz – the vital waterway through which most Middle Eastern oil and natural gas pass –

now appears to be seriously disrupted by the Iranians

.

That is certainly not what US or Israeli military planners expected. Yet, the Iranian strategy – while surprising in its vigour – is by now fairly obvious: It is to not merely survive the current confrontation, but to deter the US and Israel from mounting future attacks on the Islamic Republic.

This is even as the death toll in Iran climbs to at least 200 dead and more than 700 injured as of press time, according to the Iranian Red Crescent Society and official state-linked media, with Israel vowing to hit targets “in the heart of Tehran”.

Iran’s strategic thinking starts with the belief that US President Donald Trump will not wish to stay embroiled in warfare for too long, and that the US leader may be tempted to declare “mission accomplished” and bring this conflict to a swift closure.

After all, the killing of Mr Khamenei as well as several other top political and military commanders gives Mr Trump the perfect opportunity to claim that the US achieved its immediate objectives. And, once the US pulls its assets from the region, Israel would also be out of the game, at least for a while.

As seen from Tehran, provided the Iranian regime remains standing when the fighting stops, any end to the war can be plausibly presented as a victory for Iran, regardless of realities.

Even if all of Iran’s nuclear facilities are pulverised, the mystery about how much enriched uranium Iran managed to squirrel away will continue, so Iran could claim that it remains a potential member in the “nuclear club”.

And even if all Iranian ballistic missiles are destroyed, Iran can pretend that it has a powerful missile arsenal. In short, and provided its political structure remains intact, the Islamic Republic will not have much difficulty in claiming that it has emerged victorious from the fighting; perceptions matter far more than facts.

However, Iran’s objective is not only to emerge from this war unbowed; it also wants to persuade its enemies that it remains determined to inflict an even bigger blow on anyone who tries to attack it in the future.

For decades, Iran was shielded by its host of proxy militias throughout the Middle East: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, various paramilitaries in Syria and Iraq and the Houthis of Yemen were all there to do Iran’s bidding, to fight while Iran remained untouched.

All these props are gone, and Iran is now in the direct line of fire: It was bombed by Israel in October 2024, bombed again by Israel and the US in June 2025, and hit again now. The Iranians are lashing out and raining missiles on their immediate neighbours, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, because they wish to send a message that, should Iran ever be hit again, all of the Gulf and the Middle East will be on fire.

The Iranians are fully aware that they risk turning the Arab monarchies into enemies, reversing decades of hesitant regional cooperation. But this is a risk the Iranians are willing to take, partly because they reckon that their Arab neighbours do not matter in military terms, and partly because Iran can always patch up its relations with its neighbours at a later stage.

Yet, although shrewd, the Iranian strategy suffers from two major vulnerabilities.

The first is the possibility that, instead of pulling the plug on the operation, President Trump decides to stay the course and prolong the fighting.

According to US and Israeli intelligence estimates,

Iran has around 4,000 missiles

, equally divided between short- and medium-range versions. Since the war began in the early hours of Feb 28, the Iranians have fired around 350 missiles, less than a tenth of their arsenal, so in theory they can keep going for some time.

But the number of missiles matters less than the number of missile launchers. And having devoted the first day of the war to hitting what the military calls “high value targets” such as Iranian military commanders and top political leaders, the US and Israel are now shifting their attention to the destruction of Iran’s air defences.

If they succeed in establishing total air superiority, the US will be able to deploy its Reaper drones, which can hover in the air for more than a day, identify the locations from where the Iranians are firing their missiles, and guide firepower to destroy the launchers. Should this happen, the US can keep the military pressure on Iran going for weeks at a relatively low cost.

And the longer the war continues, the more Iran is exposed to the second weakness in its current survival strategy: The regime’s domestic control.

The authorities appear to have had little trouble in marshalling huge crowds of ordinary Iranians to mourn Ayatollah Khamenei’s killing and pledge allegiance to his successors. But these are early days, and one should not underestimate the huge psychological impact which the killing of the country’s Supreme Leader will have.

Yet again, a government which for decades thrived on its image of invincibility lies exposed as hopelessly penetrated by Israeli and US spies and utterly incapable of protecting its top leaders.

And regardless of all the official propaganda claiming that a political succession to Ayatollah Khamenei was fully prepared – Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei and senior cleric Alireza Arafi will reportedly lead Iran in the transitional period – and guaranteed to go smoothly, chances are high that in a system of competing loyalties and parallel military structures, a major power struggle is still in the offing.

For weeks, Western military strategists debated whether “regime change” in Iran required the physical presence of US troops on the ground. But the only “boots on the ground” that can generate regime change are those of ordinary Iranians.

Either way, the war is now entering its most dangerous and decisive phase, the one in which all the protagonists up their gamble in pursuit of higher stakes.