How Musk’s Starlink is helping Iranians pierce an internet blackout

TEHRAN - Iran’s government has imposed a near-total shutdown of the country’s internet after hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in late December 2025 demanding the overthrow of the regime. To bypass the censorship, some citizens are relying on SpaceX’s Starlink, the satellite internet service owned by entrepreneur Elon Musk. 

Starlink is illegal in Iran, but its receivers have been smuggled into the country in recent years and sold on the black market. The service has been helping protest organisers to communicate and alert the world to a brutal crackdown by the authorities.  

What happened to the internet in Iran?

Iran’s telecommunications industry is almost entirely state-owned, giving the government total control over voice and data traffic carried via the country’s terrestrial infrastructure. The latest web blackout that began on Jan 8 has been longer and more widespread than those imposed during previous anti-government protests in 2019 and 2022. Monitoring group Netblocks said it led to a 99 per cent drop in internet traffic. Phone services were cut for several days, before being partially restored on Jan. 13. 

Under a tiered access system, many government employees have been “white-listed” and are still able to use the worldwide internet, according to activists. State-run media are able to broadcast despite the blackout, and establishment loyalists have been uploading posts critical of the protest movement on foreign social media platforms. 

What role is Starlink playing?

Starlink can still work in Iran as its ground receivers communicate directly with a network of hundreds of satellites that zip around the globe in low-Earth orbit. There are an estimated 50,000 Starlink terminals available to users in the country, according to Mr Ahmad Ahmadian, an Iranian human rights activist and technologist now living in the US, whose organisation Holistic Resilience helped Iranians gain access to the service. Some bought them to communicate under the authorities’ radar, others to access services that are banned in Iran such as Netflix. 

The receivers include a wi-fi router and a thin, rectangular satellite dish that can be installed in minutes. Many Iranian users share their credentials to give neighbours and friends access to their wi-fi network. 

In most cases, the kits were bought in countries where Starlink is licensed. They can then be operated in countries like Iran where SpaceX doesn’t have a licence if users switch on its “roaming” setting. However, with Starlink terminals costing well over US$1,000 (S$1,288) on the black market, they are out of reach for most Iranians. 

What are the Iranian authorities doing to crack down on Starlink use?

A Starlink receiver needs a clear view of the sky, raising the risk of the units being spotted by the authorities. The government has been using drones to search for them on rooftops. Starlink signals can also be detected, according to cyber experts. 

Following its war with Israel in June 2025, the Iranian Parliament expanded its espionage laws to criminalise Starlink users. Those caught transmitting videos that are seen as undermining national security could face five years in prison. In special security situations or wartime, sentences can be escalated to 25 years. 

The country’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was among those hunting for Starlink users, according to Mr Amir Rashidi at human rights organisation Miaan Group. State-run IRIB News reported on Jan 13 that the authorities had seized “a large consignment of electronic equipment used for espionage and sabotage”, including what appeared in footage to be Starlink receivers. 

The government has also been deploying sophisticated equipment typically used for electronic warfare to try to jam Starlink signals, according to rights activists. While the efforts have disrupted services in some places, Starlink still appeared to be working across most of the country as of mid-January. 

Are there any other ways for Iranians to communicate with the world? 

Besides Starlink, the options are scarce. Other methods include shortwave radio, a century-old technology for broadcasting on high frequencies over long distances. Iranians living in border areas can try to connect to wireless cell towers in neighbouring countries. Some protesters have resorted to crossing the border illegally to send photos and videos to the outside world, according to Ms Farzaneh Badiei of Digital Medusa, an advocacy group for open internet. 

What can be done to improve Iranians’ internet access? 

US President Donald Trump called on Starlink to help restore communications in Iran. Following the request, SpaceX waived the Starlink subscription fee for users in the country from Jan 13. They can now plug in a terminal, register and use it without needing to make a payment via Mastercard or Visa, making it easier to get connected, said Mr Ahmadian. Most Iranians will still struggle to access Starlink unless huge numbers of the receivers can be spirited into the country. “That of course has its risks. And I think that it can’t happen necessarily overnight,” said Mr Jason Brodsky, policy director of US-based advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran. 

Cyber warfare could also be used to counter Iran’s internet blackout. “One of the options that the President is likely weighing is to use offensive cyber operations to jam the ability of the Iranian regime to turn off the internet and also any kind of interference that they’re trying to mount with respect to Starlink in the country,” said Mr Brodsky. This could involve sending planes over Iran that emit stronger signals than the Iranian jamming equipment, making it ineffective – essentially jamming the jammers. 

How does the internet work in Iran? 

Iran’s government has developed a type of domestic internet called the National Information Network that it uses to keep state operations and important services such as online banking functioning during a blackout. Regime insiders and state officials are provided with so-called white wireless SIM cards that still operate when the internet is shut off. The state is also able to selectively deactivate those SIM cards. 

Internet traffic is funnelled through a core system ultimately controlled by the state Telecommunication Infrastructure Company that makes it simple to remove Iranian IP addresses from the World Wide Web. This leaves Iranian citizens without a way to communicate with the outside world or access foreign websites and apps during uprisings or other emergencies. BLOOMBERG