Biden’s Thaad missile support for Israel may not deter Iran retaliation

LONDON – US President Joe Biden’s decision to

deploy a battery of the sophisticated Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (Thaad) missile system to Israel

is designed to avoid an escalation in the current dangerous showdown between the Jewish state and Iran.

In effect, the arrival of the Thaad battery aims to reassure the Israelis that the United States “has their backs” – as Mr Biden likes to put it – while warning the Iranians that if they continue firing missiles at Israel, they may end up in a confrontation with the US.

The hope in Washington is that this gesture – coupled with energetic diplomatic efforts – should be enough to limit the Israeli strike on Iran and, in turn, may even persuade the Iranians not to respond again to an incoming Israeli missile attack.

The US performed a similar feat in early April when

a previous Iranian missile attack

led to a single Israeli missile retaliation and no further Iranian response.

But it isn’t certain that what worked for American diplomats then will work similarly now.

To start with, the

Oct 1 Iranian attack on Israel

was far more extensive. It was also different: While back in April the Iranians used a mixture of drones and shorter-range missiles, the latest salvo on Israel was composed entirely of longer-range ballistic missiles, more difficult to intercept and potentially far more lethal.

Back in April, the Israelis retaliated with a single missile that hit an Iranian radar near Isfahan, the site of critical Iranian nuclear facilities. The objective was to convey a blunt hint to the Iranians that even the most precious military sites cannot be protected.

But the consensus inside Israel’s security establishment is that, since the Iranians escalated their attacks, the Israeli response now has to be sufficiently powerful to discredit the Iranian regime in the eyes of its public and those of other Middle Eastern states.

The snag is that the more Israel seeks to inflict this humiliation, the more the Iranians are likely to retaliate again, unleashing a cycle of violence that may well result in an all-out war.

And the US has an even bigger worry.

To date, Iran’s attacks have inflicted almost no casualties and minor damage on Israel; only one person was killed in the Oct 1 Iranian strike and, tragically, he happened to be a Palestinian.

But although Israel’s

Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 hypersonic anti-ballistic missile systems

performed well against the Iranian missiles, there is the possibility that Israel’s defences may be overwhelmed by a bigger future Iranian onslaught.

And there is always the risk that one Iranian missile lands in a built-up area, killing a large number of Israelis. That will unleash an almost instant major war and one that would almost certainly drag in the US in the defence of Israel.

The relatively lengthy delay between the latest Iranian attack and the anticipated Israeli retaliation is due mainly to two factors: Washington’s strenuous efforts to persuade Israel to reduce the list of targets it plans to hit inside Iran, and the time required to replenish Israel’s missile defences with fresh US deliveries.

The strained personal relationship between the US and Israeli leaders did not help matters.

A telephone call on Oct 9,

during which Mr Biden urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ensure that any retaliation remains “proportional”, was their first such conversation in nearly two months, an astonishing fact given the gravity of the current wars in the Middle East.

And in agreeing with the Americans on the list of potential Iranian targets, the Israelis proved – as always – to be tough negotiators.

Israel’s first negotiating gambit was to suggest hitting Iran’s oil rigs and refineries, as well as the country’s nuclear installations. The Israelis certainly knew that the US was bound to reject all such ideas; the suggestion was, therefore, made in the hope of gaining concessions on other Iranian targets Israel wants to hit.

Mr Netanyahu is, of course, not famous for listening to Mr Biden’s entreaties. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Israeli leader has persistently ignored the American President’s calls to limit the number of casualties Israel inflicts on Palestinian or Lebanese civilians.

But in the case of Iran, Mr Netanyahu has an interest in not defying the US, partly because a direct and sustained confrontation with Iran may well strain to the limit Israel’s military capabilities and therefore require American help, but also because Mr Netanyahu’s long-term objective is to get the US to attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Chances are high, therefore, that despite all his strong-arm negotiating tactics, the Israeli leader had to get Washington’s acceptance of the targets to be hit inside Iran.

And there is no doubt that the deployment of the Thaad battery is part of this compromise between Israel and the US.

Thaad is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during the flight’s “terminal phase” – the final stage before impact. Each battery comprises six truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptors, and radio and radar equipment.

One of the critical aspects of Thaad is that it is exclusively operated by US personnel; it requires 95 soldiers to operate.

So, while the newly deployed battery beefs up Israel’s air defence systems, it also offers the Israelis unequivocal political backing, with the presence of American troops on Israeli soil in an operational capacity.

It remains to be seen whether this will deter Iran from retaliating against the forthcoming Israeli strike.

For the moment, the Iranians remain defiant. In a social media post, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indirectly threatened the US soldiers operating the Thaad battery.

“The US has been delivering a record amount of arms to Israel,” wrote Mr Araghchi on social media platform X. “It is now also putting lives of its troops at risk by deploying them to operate US missile systems in Israel.”

That veiled threat may, of course, be just bluster.

Still, the US finds itself yet again in the paradoxical position that the only way it can hope to avoid a broader Middle East war is by putting even more of its troops in harm’s way.