Making Nato great again demands more than money

US President Donald Trump used to quip that he could shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and not lose support.

The same might be said of the royal palace in The Hague, where he arrived to a hero’s welcome despite having relentlessly berated, humiliated and questioned the utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and European allies.

Even as Mr Trump was his initially cagey self on whether Nato commitments still applied, alliance boss Mark Rutte poured on the charm.

America’s attack on Iranian nuclear sites

, despite its clear repudiation of European diplomatic efforts over the past decade, was praised as “truly extraordinary”; a move to more than double defence spending targets, another of Mr Trump’s obsessions, was described as a “big success”.

Even Germany’s Friedrich Merz has described Israel’s bombing of Iran as the necessary “dirty work” of clipping Tehran’s nuclear wings. 

This is apparently called politics – what Europeans feel they must do to preserve an alliance where the US accounts for 70 per cent of capabilities.

The America First rhetoric of Vice-President J.D. Vance in February has been politely forgotten in the face of what seems like a flip away from the Maga world’s splendid isolation. 

After all, Mr Trump

has let bunker busters fly

; he has publicly laid claim to making “the world” safer; and he has displayed the kind of credible deterrence Europeans crave as Russia continues to bomb Ukraine.

“Chapeau,” as the French say. Perhaps the global policeman can be persuaded to postpone his retirement with a barrel load of defence spending.

Yet this risks being a misreading of the memo from the Middle East.

Foreign-policy expert Steven A. Cook has suggested Mr Trump’s Iran intervention was a victory of opportunism over ideology – “Trump likes winners, and, well, the Israelis were kicking ass.”

It was also a victory of unilateralism over alliances, with Europeans left in the dark and sidelined by the world’s most powerful individual, as French diplomat Sylvie Bermann put it. 

And in terms of priority, it also put Iran before Russia. Bringing an aspiring regional hegemon to heel is not a template everywhere, as seen in Mr Trump’s subsequent “very nice” conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

It is, of course, tough to pin down where exactly we are between the Pax Americana that for decades upheld a global US-led order and the Maga alternative that would opt for restraint and retrenchment, particularly in Europe.

Mr Trump is neither consistent nor cautious; it may be that he fails to achieve the de-escalation he says he wants. 

But on the face of it, there are still plenty of elements here in tune with a move away from the old model of global hegemony and towards what has been called “offshore balancing” – intervening only when necessary to keep aspiring hegemons contained, and otherwise reliant on regional allies to do what Mr Merz might call the “dirty work”.

Given the lack of clarity on where US policy is really headed, European allies would do better to quietly question their strategic dependencies rather than take increasingly Rutte-esque steps to keep them going. 

“This is an unhealthy relationship,” says academic Christopher Layne, distinguished professor of international affairs at Texas A&M University.

Promising to spend 5 per cent of gross domestic product on defence

 may be a victory for Mr Trump, but it is neither realistic for European countries that have only just managed to reach the 2 per cent level after war in Ukraine nor helpful for understanding exactly where the cash should go to fill gaps in building a credible Europe-first deterrence.

In this respect,

Spain’s pushback

is saying the quiet bit out loud. 

Instead of letting Mr Trump’s baton conduct the pace of rearmament, it is time for Europe to discover its inner General De Gaulle – or at least leaders worthy of the name.

Mr Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron are taking a united stance, but this should go beyond financial commitments and into identifying who should buy what and where in the name of common European defence.

It is also notable that there is much talk about defence spending and very little about economic growth, which is away without official leave in Germany or France.

Europe has a lot of problems, as the US frequently likes to point out, so all the more reason the continent takes ownership of them.

This also matters for America’s allies beyond Europe. One of the Maga mantras is that China is the one aspiring hegemon that the US needs to focus on, and Asia the one region where offshore balancing would be too risky, given the threat to Taiwan.

Yet Mr Trump has also blown hot and cold here, from recent trade talks to his latest declaration that

Beijing could keep buying Iranian oil

.

The US is also

reviewing the Aukus security pact

with Australia and Britain. Treaties last while they last, as Gen De Gaulle once said. BLOOMBERG