Commentary
Once Germany’s protector, Washington is no longer its North Star
Amid trade wars, military uncertainty and far-right normalisation, Germany is pushed to chart its own course.
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US Vice-President J.D. Vance meeting German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 14, 2025.
PHOTO: REUTERS
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BERLIN – For decades, the US was more than just a powerful ally to Germany. It was the cornerstone of Germany’s post-war rebirth. But that position is rapidly crumbling.
America established the Marshall Plan in 1948, making available billions to rebuild the war-torn country. It helped resurrect the nation’s democratic institutions, provided the military umbrella under which Germany thrived and later supported reunification at a time when France and Britain were anything but forthcoming. The US was not just a partner, it was, for many, the very definition of Western security and stability.
However, the US under Mr Donald Trump’s second presidency is no longer speaking the language of partnership.
Europe is increasingly portrayed as an adversary, Nato as a liability, and Russia as a misunderstood peer rather than a threat. What’s more, a full-scale transatlantic trade war looms, triggered by sweeping new tariffs aimed at European products, particularly in the automotive industry. For Germany, a country not only deeply embedded in global trade but also Europe’s biggest car manufacturer, this shift feels existential.
So far, Germany has deferred its response to the European Union, which has presented a robust plan for retaliation. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said that while the EU prefers negotiation to confrontation, it is prepared to implement countermeasures if necessary.
The proposed strategy includes tariffs on approximately US$28 billion (S$37.6 billion) worth of US goods, targeting sectors such as steel, aluminium, textiles, home appliances and agricultural products.
Will I still be welcome in the US?
The sense of alienation is not only political, it’s personal. During a recent trip to the US, as I stood in line at immigration, a strange feeling crept in: I was wondering whether my laptop was “clean” and whether something in my e-mails or chat history could be interpreted as critical of the US.
In the back of my mind was the story about a Frenchman whose entry was denied after the officer had skimmed through his laptop and cellphone. Such a moment of self-censorship would have been unthinkable just a few months ago. In a country that has long championed free speech and the exchange of ideas, it felt surreal.
All the more so because I grew up with the deep conviction that America embodied all that was good, exciting and new. I listened to blues, jazz, and rock music on the Armed Forces Network, which could be heard anywhere in Germany where there was a US military presence. I read American novels by Philip Roth and Joan Didion, watched US television series, and dreamed of one day studying and living in the country that fascinated me so deeply.
And now, I found myself worrying that I might no longer be welcome in that very country.
Friends and colleagues I met in Washington, themselves dismayed by the state of their government, greeted me with embarrassment. “This isn’t the America we believe in,” one told me. Others apologised for what the country had become. Their disillusionment echoed my own sense of disbelief.
Too reliant on the US?
For Germans, this disconnect hits particularly hard. A majority of people grew up believing that the US, through all its turbulence, would ultimately remain a loyal ally. That belief is now eroding rapidly. A growing sense of abandonment is fuelling a national reckoning: What is Germany’s role in the world without the US at its side?
One consequence of this shift is already visible: Germany’s long-held taboo on military spending is collapsing.
In a stunning break from decades of fiscal orthodoxy, the German Bundestag – or Lower House of Parliament – recently voted to loosen strict debt rules to ramp up the country’s ailing military infrastructure.
Among the most debated topics: Whether Germany should cancel its €8.3 billion (S$12 billion) order of 35 American F-35 fighter jets. Underlying it is a deeper question: Are we making ourselves too dependent on a country that is increasingly hostile towards us?
This question is not without cause. A new Allensbach Institute survey paints a sobering picture of the current sentiment: 82 per cent of Germans believe the US and Europe are drifting apart. Only 11 per cent view the transatlantic relationship as “good”, while 78 per cent describe it as “bad”. Alarmingly, two-thirds see President Trump’s return to power as equally dangerous as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Europe.
A need to redefine its global role
Yet, not all segments of society are alarmed. Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), which in the national elections in February gained a good 20 per cent, holds a strikingly different view.
Many of its supporters admire Mr Trump’s unapologetic style and strongman tactics. Among them, there is little fear – only fascination. For these voters, Mr Trump is seen as a leader who “gets things done”, unencumbered by too much political correctness, wokeness or multilateral entanglements.
Their perspective is a troubling reminder that Germany, now already for some time, is not immune to populism and a sweep towards autocratic rule. Remembering the horrors of the Nazi past is no longer the insurmountable bulwark it once was against the rise of the far right.
Today, expressing support for the AfD has become increasingly socially acceptable. Mr Trump, and even more so his billionaire ally Elon Musk, have played a role in normalising this shift. Both have openly endorsed a party that sympathises with Mr Putin, calls for an end to aid for Ukraine, and promotes a hardline anti-immigration agenda. A party that is partially observed by the domestic intelligence service because it operates on the fringes or outside the Constitution.
What’s at stake, therefore, is much more than just military cooperation or economic alignment. It is the very foundation of Germany’s post-war identity – a belief in multilateralism, rules-based order and liberal democracy, all of which once were inspired and supported by the American model.
Now, Germany faces a stark reality. It must quickly mature into a self-reliant power, capable of defending not only its interests but also its values. That means increasing military capabilities, deepening ties with European partners such as France, Poland and Britain, and redefining its global role beyond the comfortable shelter of the American alliance.
Whether Germany likes it or not, it is being thrust into a leadership role it did not ask for – but can no longer avoid. The US, once its compass and protector, is now unpredictable at best, and adversarial at worst.
Markus Ziener is a professor at Media University Berlin and writes on political and security issues.

