Intensified Russian assault on Ukraine: Sign of upcoming land offensive or mounting frustration?

BRUSSELS – Russia has intensified its assault on Ukraine by massively expanding its air strikes on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Kyiv is now the regular target for intense nightly Russian barrages consisting of at least 300 drones plus a similar number of various other Russian explosive devices, including the hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missile, capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

These heavy raids align with recent claims from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who warns that Russia is preparing a new land offensive against his country to coincide with the onset of summer.

But Western intelligence analysts are unanimous in their assessments that, far from indicating renewed military vitality, the latest heavy attacks on Kyiv are a sign of Russia’s relative weakness and growing frustration with a military tide that is slowly turning in Ukraine’s favour.

Ukraine is still in no position to recapture the roughly 19 per cent of its territory currently occupied by Russian troops. Nonetheless, the Ukrainians are now able to inflict heavier casualties on their invaders, as well as impose an increasingly unbearable strain on the Russian economy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022 with the expectation that his military would take over Ukraine in a matter of weeks. When he met stiff Ukrainian resistance, Putin settled for an attrition war, confident that Russia would ultimately subdue Ukraine.

Attrition war fails to work in Russia’s favour

Putin’s belief that an attrition war would work in Russia’s favour was based on two fundamental assumptions.

The first was that, regardless of how much help Ukraine got from the West, Russia would be able to throw much more into the battle.

Putin’s other assumption was that the Russian public could be persuaded to go along with an attrition war as long as the Russian soldiers dying in battle were not conscripts but professional soldiers, and as long as Russia’s economy remained unaffected.

For years, Putin’s strategy seemed to be working.

Russian battlefield casualties were horrendous. “Almost half a million Russian soldiers have been killed since the conflict began,” Anne Keast-Butler, the head of GCHQ, Britain’s largest spy agency, said in a May 27 assessment. But the teenage sons of Russia’s middle classes living in the country’s main cities remained untouched. Those who died were mostly men from Russia’s vast and impoverished hinterland, who flocked to sign up to well-paid military contracts.

In addition, for most Russians, the war – or the “Special Military Operation” as the authorities are still determined to call it – remained just a matter of media reports flashing on their TV screens. Supermarkets and shops continued to be well-stocked, and government expenditure on the military boosted employment and wages for everyone.

The snag for Putin is that Ukraine has now overturned all these assumptions.

While the Trump administration is no longer providing credits to Ukraine, the Europeans have just approved a landmark €90 billion (S$134 billion) support loan to Ukraine, which should cover all the country’s economic and military needs until the end of 2027. At least half of this will go towards boosting Ukraine’s national defence industry, which is rapidly transforming the country into a formidable military power.

Drones elevating Ukraine’s strategic leverage

In 2025, Ukraine produced around 3.5 million drones. This year, the output is scheduled to double. Ukrainian military planners now boast that they can put in the air around 20,000 drones each day.

The result is that the front line separating Russian and Ukrainian forces is now a 35km “death strip” in which nothing can move without being zapped by drones from one side or another.

“Ninety per cent of the casualties on the Russian side are caused by drones,” said retired US general David Petraeus, who commanded American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is frequently in Ukraine. “Tanks can’t manoeuvre any more, and armoured vehicles can’t survive. You can’t even drive a vehicle,” Petraeus added.

The battle lines remain frozen, even in the height of summer.

The problem for the Russians is twofold. Western intelligence estimates indicate that the number of Russians now killed or wounded daily exceeds the number of men Russia can sign up for service, so Ukraine is now inflicting casualties on Russia at rates faster than Russia is replacing them.

The Russians have responded to this by reducing basic training for fresh troops from the initial three months to around 10 days. But poorly trained soldiers thrown into battle with little preparation risk death in even greater numbers, so sooner or later Putin may have to face the choice he always sought to avoid: Ordering conscripts into the war – a move which will sow panic among Russian families and prompt a flight of youngsters desperate to avoid the draft.

More significantly, Ukraine’s defence industries are now producing missiles capable of striking deep inside Russia, thereby bringing the war to the homes of most ordinary Russians.

Ukraine’s preference for striking Russian oil installations and refineries not only hurts Russia’s key export and revenue earners but also damages Russian pride: Burning oil installations, with their massive fireballs and smoke plumes, are evidence of Putin’s inability to defend the national territory.

Russian economy under strain

If this is not enough, the war is also beginning to weigh heavily on the Russian economy. With over half of all the yearly expenditure now going to the military, pensions and social security benefit payments no longer keep up with basic food prices, which jumped by 20 per cent over the past 12 months.

Aiming to squeeze out inflation, Russia’s central bank had to respond with high interest rates. But this, in turn, squeezed out manufacturing: Russian companies are now devoting a record 38 per cent of their profits to just servicing their debts.

Although the oil and natural gas industries stand to benefit from higher global prices, they are also starved of the investment necessary for the exploration of new energy deposits and face additional military burdens. Under new rules, Russian energy firms are now expected to contribute to the defence of their installations from Ukrainian air attacks.

In short, all the assumptions Putin had about Russia’s ability to withstand an attrition war are now being challenged.

By intensifying his bombardment of Kyiv, Putin evidently hopes to break Ukrainian political resolve and force Zelensky to the negotiating table on terms favourable to Russia.

But although Zelensky’s domestic approval ratings are indeed falling, his international room for manoeuvre is increasing. Ukraine’s drone capabilities are coveted in the Middle East, and political support from the rest of Europe remains strong.

Putin may live to regret his decision not to accept previous US mediation efforts in the conflict. These could have delivered to Russia more concessions than Putin can squeeze out of Ukraine now.