What does Trump want? Gulf states have no answer as Iran war escalates

The temporary ceasefire that the US and Iran signed on June 17 is all but dead, with both countries now locked in a dangerous escalatory spiral. For the US, the stakes have increased with two deaths as a result of Iranian strikes on American facilities in Jordan. However, without a clear strategy and accompanying objectives clearly laid out by the commander-in-chief, the US faces the real prospect of being dragged into yet another long-drawn war in the Middle East.

The famed Chinese strategist Sun Tzu once advised: “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Those words are as relevant today as they were during the Warring States period of Chinese history more than 2,200 years ago.

When US President Donald Trump gave orders to launch Operation Epic Fury in late February, it was unclear to observers what America’s strategic objectives were at that point. After all, it was only a few months prior, when the administration released the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, that the Western Hemisphere was identified as the top concern in its list of core US national interests that required Washington’s attention and, by extension, resources. Yet, the US, under the Trump presidency, finds itself drawn back to the Middle East.

What’s more, that same document also discussed the importance of clear strategic aims, pointing out that: “American strategies since the end of the Cold War have fallen short – they have been laundry lists of wishes or desired end states; have not clearly defined what we want but instead stated vague platitudes; and have often misjudged what we should want.” 

In the case of the Iran war, it has been difficult to divine, in the words of the NSS, “what should the United States want”. For America’s Arab allies, it’s an unresolved mystery that has nonetheless dispatched their carefully laid plans for the future through the shredder of a geopolitical sandstorm.

Trump’s justifications have ranged from degrading Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability and destroying its naval forces to decimating its missile stocks, eliminating an immediate security threat (to the US, it seems), and regime change. Of course, one could plausibly surmise that this constitutes a “laundry list” of strategic objectives all directed at weakening Iran – except that there are deep inconsistencies at play.

Iran’s nuclear capabilities, according to Trump, had already been “obliterated” in June 2025 with Operation Midnight Hammer. Iranian missiles and drones were said to have been significantly depleted, yet Tehran clearly retains sufficient supply to still harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and rain retaliatory strikes on US allies in the Middle East.

In the build-up to the stillborn memorandum of understanding (MOU), Trump raised eyebrows among both regional allies and members of his own defence establishment by defending Iran’s right to replenish its missile stockpiles when he said: “They need to be able to defend themselves. They can’t have nuclear. But they need to be able to defend themselves. Everybody does.” In other words, the strategic objective seems to be to destroy Iran’s deterrent capability and then allow them to rebuild it.

Recent revelations of Israeli efforts to cultivate former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and place him at the pinnacle of a new government in Tehran indicate that there was indeed a genuine plan to effect regime change. But we also know that the plan failed. Iranian internal security would be even more alert to this now.

As the conflict wore on, the US narrative has shifted to focus on the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Given that the strait was already open prior to hostilities, it is bizarrely ironic that this seems to have emerged as the top strategic priority. As for tolls, Trump’s unapologetic response that it’s an American prerogative is nothing if not quintessentially him.

This manner of monetising the war, in keeping with broader trends of US foreign policy under the Trump presidency, has since taken another turn, with the President suggesting on July 14 that “kings and emirs” (referring to the leaders of America’s Gulf allies) will purportedly sign a raft of trade and investment deals with the US in exchange for security of shipping passage through the strait. Thus far, Gulf states have neither confirmed nor denied that such commitments have been made.

Keeping the larger strategic picture in sight

Notwithstanding Trump’s idiosyncratic approach to the Iran war, there is a larger stake involved in the region, one that expresses longstanding US global strategy: to prevent the emergence of a regional power intent on pursuing policies at odds with US interests and those of its friends and allies. This explains the more than 20 military bases, installations, and host-nation military facilities the US has access to in the Middle East, with more than a dozen in the Persian Gulf alone.

For their part, regional allies see the US playing a critical role not only in terms of supplying the most advanced defence equipment, but more importantly, maintaining open sea lanes crucial for maritime commerce, and also balancing against their strategic rival, Iran. This is the larger strategic picture that US allies in the Middle East hope Washington does not lose sight of.

To that end, the war is presumably about eroding not only Iranian tactical capabilities but also its strategic influence in the region, which Tehran has hitherto parlayed through its relationships with Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and, until its collapse in December 2024, the Assad regime in Syria.

While many of these Iranian allies have been crippled by way of mostly Israeli operations, they have not been – and are unlikely to be – eliminated entirely. What this means is that there is every chance they will seek ways to regroup, reconstitute, rearm and rebuild in time.

On July 20, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia, opening a new front in the war. Iran had been pressing the Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea, which had allowed the Saudis to divert its oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz. 

The harsh reality is that Gulf Arab states cannot afford to drop backchannel talks with Tehran, even as they continue to be targeted by the Iranians.

At the same time, they cannot cut ties with the US either, notwithstanding private misgivings about US reliability or the paradox that the US bases and installations that were meant to protect them have in fact placed them in Iran’s sights. There is simply no other security provider. China has been content to stand on the sidelines, Russia is preoccupied with its own exhausting conflict with Ukraine, and the Europeans are no longer able to project power.

The Gulf response

This is not to say that the Gulf Arab states are in perfect alignment among themselves on the Iran question. Although all their capitals have channels of communication with Tehran that remain open, notable differences prevail in their positions on conflict escalation.

On the face of it, the United Arab Emirates appears most robust in pushing back against Iran. Abu Dhabi has expressed deep disappointment with Tehran for targeting it the most among Arab states despite the close relations Abu Dhabi has cultivated with Tehran (not to mention the sizeable Iranian wealth domiciled in Dubai). To that end, the UAE has taken a strong stance and cast its lot with the US and Israel, both of whom have been the primary suppliers of defence systems that have been used against Iranian drone and missile attacks.

Nevertheless, illustrative of the complex strategic landscape in the Gulf that does not lend to tidy mapping, reports have also surfaced that Abu Dhabi has been pursuing deals with Tehran which involve unlocking frozen Iranian assets in exchange for an end to attacks.

Bahrain, also victim of a considerable number of Iranian attacks, has correspondingly drawn closer to the UAE, which has assisted Manama in repelling these attacks.

Oman, on the other hand, has hewed closely to its traditional foreign policy approach of maintaining good ties with all parties including Iran, with which it has had several rounds of discussions on the possibility of charging fees for Strait of Hormuz transit.

Saudi Arabia, the presumptive regional power with much at stake, has prioritised the return of stability over decisive victory, while Qatar licks its wounds after its good offices in mediating US-Iran talks were repaid by new Iranian strikes after the ceasefire.

These divergent views and responses have also rendered the Gulf Cooperation Council ineffective in anything resembling a collective response. Indeed, the impotence of the GCC is further accentuated by bilateral differences between its two anchor members, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

No good alternatives

For these reasons, even while they explore new sources of weapons such as South Korea and Ukraine, America’s Gulf allies can be expected to double down on their dependence on the US security umbrella against an Iranian threat that is now no longer an abstraction.

But therein lies the rub: The absence of alternative sources of strategic heft means that even as they pursue pragmatic policies, they will have to be price takers in the face of a US administration that sees security provision less as a strategic matter of credibility, public goods, and institutionalised cooperation to sustain regional stability, and more as a commercial transaction in which narrow self-interests are paramount.

As the MOU between the US and Iran unravels, the outlook is grim for the Arab states caught in the crossfire of start-stop retaliatory strikes between the two.

The Trump administration cannot be unaware of the political costs of a prolonged conflict as the midterm elections set for November draw closer. But having been seen to back down once with the ceasefire that is now dead, a second TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) by Trump looks even more remote. It doesn’t help that in the absence of strategic clarity, this deadly game of chicken has come down to who has the last word on control over the Strait of Hormuz.

For Iranian leaders, Hormuz, a chokepoint for energy exports that gives Iran power over the global economy, is vital leverage the regime will not give up. National pride aside, it is about regime survival.

The upshot is if both parties continue going down this road, driven by a frame of mind that sees battlefield escalation as the way to a quick, transactional win, the risks of mission creep rises. How this ends is still unclear, but what is apparent even now is that the security of America’s friends and allies in the Gulf has become collateral damage to a deadly test of wills.