<p>A photo taken on April 22, 2022 shows China's ambassador to the Solomon Islands Li Ming (R), and Solomons Prime Pinister Manasseh Sogavare (L) attending the opening ceremony of a China-funded national stadium complex in Honiara. - The stadium complex, reportedly worth 53 million USD, will host the 2023 Pacific Games for the first time in the island state of 800,000 people. (Photo by Mavis PODOKOLO / AFP)</p>
PHOTO: AFP
China’s new security agreement with the Solomon Islands has sparked controversy and garnered attention around the world.
The deal, which Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare described as a "treaty" to the Solomon Islands Parliament, has not been made public. The implications of the agreement are far-reaching, most importantly for China, the Solomon Islands, Australia and the United States.
The primary driver behind the agreement is China’s long-term strategy of displacing the US as the predominant power in the Western Pacific, says Dr Euan Graham, senior fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
As for Honiara, its motivations for pursuing closer security cooperation with China are complex, fitting more or less within the broad definition of "regime security".
<p>Members of Russia's Emergencies Ministry remove debris of a residential building destroyed during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine May 11, 2022. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko</p>
PHOTO: X03560
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has polarised Asean with one group condemning it and the other sympathetic to Moscow.
Asean, he writes, can expect to face intense pressure from both sides as it convenes its dialogue partner meetings throughout the year.
This will invariably lead to questions about the continued validity and usefulness of Asean’s regional security institutions such as the Asean Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, he says.
Asean’s value then is to be a neutral, reliable "bridge" for the hegemons to co-exist at the very least and to build towards cooperation, instead of focusing on strategic competition.
India’s unexpected FTA appetite
<p>(FILES) In this file photograph taken on May 11, 2021, health workers wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE kit) prepare the funeral pyre for those who died due to the Covid-19 coronavirus at a cremation ground in New Delhi. - New Delhi on May 5, 2022, has slammed as flawed the World Health Organization's estimated pandemic-related death total for India -- which put the numbers at 10 times the country's official toll. The WHO estimated some 4.75 million deaths in India since 2020 could be attributed to the crisis, either directly from Covid-19 or indirectly through the pandemic's wider impact on health systems and society. (Photo by Sajjad HUSSAIN / AFP)</p>
PHOTO: AFP
What explains India’s rush to sign a swathe of free trade agreements (FTA), including with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and most recently, Australia?
Could this really be the nation that not long ago so abruptly walked out at the last minute from the negotiations for the Asean-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership?
Meaningful trade relations are essential to overcome any supply interruptions that future episodes of the pandemic, or similar unanticipated setbacks, might produce.
For a country like India that has large import dependencies, efforts to diversify sourcing necessitates engaging in new trade agreements.
For India, the new FTAs concluded with the UAE and Australia, and the ones being negotiated with the UK, Canada, and the European Union, offer it opportunities of engaging in preferential trade with some of its most vital economic partners.
These FTAs can provide India with considerable prospects in the diversification of sourcing, securing investments for building local capacities and creating more opportunities for its exports.
In a separate piece, this paper for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) argues that trade multilateralism is not dead, as recent commentary might suggest. It has just taken a different form.
<p>Vietnam's flagbearer holds their national flag during the opening ceremony of the 31st Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games) at the My Dinh National Stadium in Hanoi on May 12, 2022. (Photo by Nhac NGUYEN / AFP)</p>
PHOTO: AFP
Like India after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the other Asian nation caught between a rock and a hard place on its enduring ties with Moscow, is Vietnam.
That said, Vietnam has been bolstering ties with American allies and partners, including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, as well as key European nations.
Vietnam also recently completed its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, reinforcing its image as a responsible player on the international stage.
Earlier this year, Washington spotlighted Hanoi as a “leading regional partner” in its Indo-Pacific strategy.
That said, from Hanoi’s perspective, while it values Russia ties, it does not wish to see its relations with Washington and other Western partners, including on the South China Sea and Mekong issues, negatively impacted by its position on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
As such, it is likely that Vietnam will try to weather the Russia storm and preserve ties with both Moscow and Washington, as well as other Western nations, says Mr Grossman.
