North Korea – where professional success in politics breeds personal danger

North Korea celebrated the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army in February.

As it showed off 12 of its intercontinental ballistic missiles in a military parade, expert Korea watchers noted that there appeared to have been some significant changes in the military and political hierarchy.

Mr Choe Ryong Hae, the chairman of the standing committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was reportedly the only member of the politburo presidium not in attendance.

But the Workers’ Party of Korea (North Korea’s sole and ruling political party) has reportedly recently replaced five of the 12 officials in the party secretariat and seven members of the 17-strong politburo. This is according to South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which exists to promote the reunification of the two countries.

Two officials whose careers are reportedly on the rise are General Song Yong Gon (a member of the Workers’ Party central committee and previously the commander of the 9th Corps of the Korean People’s Army) and Choe Kil Ryong, until now commander of the 2nd Army Corps. The pair have been promoted and are now commanders of the new units for two classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The promotions appear to confirm Pyongyang’s focus on long-range missiles, which have become a central element in the country’s nuclear testing regime. In recent months, North Korea has tested two Hwasong-class missiles – intercontinental ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 15,000km, capable of reaching the continental United States.

The wider context of the reported purges is characterised by rising tension on the Korean peninsula. The Workers’ Party plenum in Pyongyang in December 2022 emphasised a hardline policy towards South Korea, including the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol has indicated that Seoul would not hesitate to retaliate and could develop its own nuclear capability.

At the same time, the Kim regime is facing severe domestic crises due to its weak economy, exacerbated by the challenges of Covid-19 and harsh international sanctions. Food insecurity in North Korea was recently described by a United States think-tank as “at its worst since the country’s famine in the 1990s”.

Consolidating power

North Korea’s political system gives absolute power to the leader, which is both a strength and a vulnerability. Mr Kim Jong Un, who came to power in 2011 shortly after the death of his father Kim Jong Il, has had to constantly struggle to prevent the emergence of alternative centres of power.

Unlike his father, Mr Kim had only a short time to prepare for leadership and was (and remains, at 39) quite young in a culture that reveres elders. His first few years were particularly dangerous for him.

At the third party conference in September 2010, Mr Kim Jong Il replaced 78 per cent of the politburo. This was seemingly to formally establish his third son as heir apparent and to put in place “guardians” for the young Kim, such as his uncle Jang Song Thaek and senior military figure Ri Yong Ho.

Mr Kim Jong Un replaced his father in December 2011 and, at the party conference the following April, 42 per cent of the politburo was replaced, followed by the removal of another 13 per cent at the 2013 party plenum. It was reported that some in the top leadership – including members of Mr Kim’s own family – were scheming against him.

A dangerous family

These purges continued to create a climate of fear in Pyongyang. In 2012, Vice-Minister of the Army Kim Chol was executed “for reportedly drinking and carousing during the official mourning period after Kim Jong Il’s death”.

A similar fate befell Vice-Marshall Ri, one of the senior team which had guided Mr Kim Jong Un as he was preparing for leadership and by then the chief of staff of the North Korean military. He was removed from his positions and is believed to have been executed amid rumours of disagreement over economic policy.

But the most prominent victim of the early consolidation of Mr Kim’s rule was his uncle and former mentor Jang Song Thaek, the second-most powerful person in North Korea until his execution in 2013 (lurid reports of him either being torn to pieces by dogs or executed by machine gun have never been confirmed).

Mr Jang, who was accused of being part of a bureaucratic clique engaged in sedo (lust for power) may have become a real threat to Mr Kim due to his close relations with the Chinese government and his efforts to consolidate control over key elements of the economy.

On Feb 13, 2017, Mr Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam was murdered in an assassination which made international headlines. He had been in exile for some time in Macau after falling from grace, which he claimed was due to his advocacy of political reform.

He was exposed to VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport by two women – an Indonesian and a Vietnamese – who claimed they had been asked to play a prank and had no idea of the identity of their target. This was another sign of the intense power struggle within the Kim family itself.

Violent reshuffles

These fairly regular purges of North Korea’s elite are partly to fend off alleged coup plots, but studies of Pyongyang’s leadership show that they are also a key mechanism to maintain control over the bureaucracy, a system also effectively used by Mr Kim Jong Il.

In an absolute dictatorship, it is an important mechanism to inoculate the leadership from responsibility for policy failure by blaming others. An absolute leader who demands complete allegiance and unquestioning loyalty from his population cannot be seen to accept responsibility for any of his government’s mistakes, especially when they result – as they have recently – in hardship for so many in the country.

For Mr Kim Jong Un, as with his predecessors in the North Korean leadership, a purge is a political tool similar to a reshuffle in Downing Street. Expect to read of more while the “Respected Comrade” remains in power.