Has Indonesia jumped to US camp? It’s not so simple

JAKARTA – One word leapt off the page when Indonesian negotiators signed a tariff agreement with the United States on Feb 19, 2026: “alliance”.

At first glance, it hinted at a shift towards Washington. For decades, Indonesia has carefully avoided language suggesting bloc membership or binding strategic commitments and stuck with its commitment to staying non-aligned.

The word “alliance” carries obligations that clash with Indonesia’s longstanding approach: Maintain cordial relations with all major powers, but formally align with none.

Dr Dino Patti Djalal, a former deputy foreign minister and ambassador to Washington, was among the first to question the wording. He noted that the term had never appeared in Indonesia’s official documents and asked whether anyone in Jakarta had authorised its use.

Jakarta, however, is not naive. Officials understand precisely what the word implies. Since independence in 1945, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been anchored in the doctrine of bebas aktif, or “free and active”. The principle allows Jakarta to work with many partners but stops short of commitments resembling a military or strategic alliance.

As Mr Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, an international relations researcher at the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, told The Straits Times: “When we press Foreign Ministry officials on their red lines, it usually comes down to whether non-alignment is being put to the test. Their strongest guard rail is non-alliance.”

Why, then, did the word appear at all?

One possibility is that Jakarta is testing closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation with Washington. But a more likely reason is that Washington itself framed the deal as an “alliance” to fit its Indo-Pacific narrative – whether or not Jakarta endorses that interpretation.

US policymakers increasingly view Indonesia as central to their efforts to strengthen supply chains, build regional resilience and balance China’s growing influence. Describing the relationship as an “alliance” fits Washington’s agenda, not Indonesia’s.

“The term ‘alliance’ is not easily or commonly accepted in Indonesia’s foreign policy,” said Mr Agung Baskoro, executive director of research group Trias Politika Strategis. “But it shows that the US sees Indonesia as a strategic partner, while Indonesia safeguards its key sectors.”

A more blunt reading is that the wording exposes the power imbalance in the talks: Jakarta was effectively compelled to accept language projecting a closer strategic bond than it would ever voluntarily endorse.

“There is no precedent for its use. This reflects pressure from the US. Otherwise, there is no incentive,” Mr Waffaa said.

Jakarta’s balancing act

Several moves this past year might suggest that President Prabowo Subianto’s administration has edged closer to Washington.

The most controversial of these was the move to join the Board of Peace (BOP) initiative led by US President Donald Trump and aimed at stabilising Gaza, and offering to deploy up to 8,000 Indonesian peacekeeping troops there as part of its proposed multinational force.

The Gaza issue is especially sensitive in Indonesia, where public sympathy for Palestine runs deep. Few Indonesian leaders would normally risk appearing closely tied to a US-led initiative whose benefits for Palestinians remain unclear.

So why do this at all? Before jumping to conclusions, it is worthwhile placing this picture beside another moment.

On Sept 3, 2025, a striking photograph emerged of Mr Prabowo standing alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at Tiananmen Square during a military parade marking 80 years since Japan’s defeat in World War II. The event was widely seen as a show of strength for Mr Xi and was provocative towards Washington.

Now, wouldn’t the BOP appearance look much the same as the Tiananmen moment – less a strategic shift than another symbolic gesture? Both project the same message: Mr Prabowo positioning Indonesia alongside the world’s major powers, whether Beijing or Washington.

The Indonesian President has repeatedly stressed that this balancing act is deliberate. Speaking in Indonesia on March 9, he again underscored the country’s longstanding doctrine.

“Our nation, our country is on the right path. We are on a non-aligned path. We are always on the path of a free and active, non-bloc stance. We do not want to join any bloc. We respect all powers. We respect all countries. That is Indonesia.”

Still, Jakarta does see political value in engaging Washington more closely. One aim is recognition. Indonesia wants the US to treat it as a major regional power, not merely another partner in South-east Asia.

Such recognition strengthens Jakarta’s diplomatic standing and signals that Indonesia expects a seat in shaping Indo-Pacific discussions.

Closer ties with Washington also offer leverage and strengthen Indonesia’s hand when dealing with China and other major powers. Engagement with multiple partners allows Jakarta to balance interests, extract concessions and avoid dependence on any single power.

The thing is, if Indonesia is truly moving towards alliance status with the US, the clearest signs would be in defence policy. US alliances in Asia are typically anchored by security treaties or military access arrangements.

The Philippines, for instance, operates under a 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty that allows US forces access to bases and provides Manila with a clear security guarantee.

Indonesia has none of those. There is no mutual defence pact with Washington; no permanent US military presence exists on Indonesian soil. Jakarta has been careful to preserve that distance.

Transactional trade deal

The US-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed on Feb 19 has been framed by some as evidence that Jakarta is drawing closer to Washington. A closer look tells a different story: a pragmatic bargain in which Indonesia had to trade policy space across several sectors to secure tariff relief.

The agreement cut the reciprocal tariff on Indonesian goods from 32 per cent to 19 per cent and eliminated tariffs on 1,819 products. At first glance, that appears favourable, but the concessions reveal Jakarta’s calculated compromises.

For instance, Indonesia, which holds the world’s largest nickel reserves – used for electric vehicle batteries – has given the US access to it. The US is racing to build domestic battery supply chains while reducing reliance on China, whose companies have invested billions of dollars in Indonesia’s nickel industry over the past decade. This is a strategic win for the US.

Jakarta has also agreed to procure about US$13.5 billion (S$17.3 billion) worth of aircraft and aviation-related goods and services from the US, including purchases from Boeing. The pledge is striking given the country’s fiscal constraints.

Energy also comes with a hefty price tag. Indonesia pledged to buy roughly US$15 billion in US fuels and emerging products such as blue ammonia, a significant sum for a government balancing tight budgets.

Washington’s clearest gain may lie in the digital sector. Jakarta agreed not to impose digital service taxes on US technology firms such as Google, Meta and Netflix. It will also remove customs duties on electronic transmissions and prohibit rules that require companies to transfer technology or disclose source code.

In other words, Indonesia has paid a steep price for securing tariff relief. But trade negotiations are rarely symmetrical, and the agreement looks less like a tilt towards Washington than a familiar exercise in economic pragmatism. Nor does Jakarta enter the deal empty-handed. Jakarta secures investment, technology and sectoral gains that support domestic industrial goals while modernising aviation, energy and digital infrastructure.

“If there’s anything that can be good that comes out of this deal is the incentive for US companies to come invest in Indonesia in these sectors. But of course this depends on the corporations, whether they will come or not,” Mr Waffaa said.

Limits of alignment

The deal remains to be ratified by Indonesia’s House of Representatives, where it may come under some fire.

Complicating matters, a recent US Supreme Court ruling affecting the reciprocal tariff framework means Indonesia may now face tariffs closer to 15 per cent rather than the 19 per cent rate originally negotiated, reducing the urgency for Parliament to ratify the agreement.

But ground realities suggest that Jakarta’s deal with the US was a balancing act rather than a tilt in its direction.

To start with, China is a major investor in sectors from nickel processing to infrastructure. Any dramatic shift towards the US could carry economic risks that Jakarta simply cannot afford to take.

The US is the world’s most powerful nation that Indonesia needed to appease. At the same time, China remains the country’s most important trading partner, with Singapore, India and Japan also playing key roles, and Jakarta knows it cannot annoy them either.

Regional diplomacy further shapes Indonesia’s choices. As the largest ASEAN country, openly siding with a major power could make it seem biased and Indonesia is mindful of this.

The country has to tread carefully in its dealings with the US, given the superpower’s might and heft. At the same time, Jakarta guards its autonomy jealously.

Washington can call it an “alliance” if it likes. The label does not change Indonesia’s strategy. Jakarta is engaging every major power, extracting what it can, and keeping its options open.