Forum: Study potential security risks linked to undersea power cables

In 2024, Singapore approved a proposal to import solar power from Darwin, Australia, via 4,300km of undersea cables (Singapore gives conditional nod to import solar power from Australia via 4,300km of subsea cables, Oct 22, 2024).

There has been a spate of alleged sabotage operations recently in the Baltic Sea targeting undersea cables, prompting investigations and allegations of hybrid warfare.

In January, Taiwan accused a Chinese ship of damaging one of the undersea cables connecting the island to the internet (Taiwan, China trade barbs over undersea cable damage, Jan 9).

These developments have exposed undersea cables as vulnerable targets in geopolitical conflict, with incidents of sabotage becoming increasingly common.

Experts predict that such “grey zone” acts will recur as adversaries seek to exploit this strategic vulnerability.

Singapore’s energy security is currently predicated on diversification and resilience. Dependence on solar power transmitted through undersea cables would introduce a critical vulnerability. A deliberate attack on these cables by hostile actors could disrupt power supply, jeopardise national security and compromise our economy.

The challenge lies in the inherent difficulty of guarding undersea cables stretching thousands of kilometres. Sabotaging such cables is relatively easy and requires no munitions – recent incidents involved commercial ships allegedly damaging cables with their anchors.

Repairing damaged cables is a time-intensive process, which could leave Singapore exposed to prolonged power shortages.

While the transition to renewable energy remains a commendable goal, we must weigh the potential security risks against the benefits.

Peter Heng Teck Wee