Bersama could really become a third force in Malaysian politics

A political earthquake struck in Malaysia over the weekend when former economy minister Rafizi Ramli and former natural resources and environmental sustainability minister Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad presided over a ceremony marking their takeover of the reins of the rebranded Malaysian United Party – known as Bersama – and their formal exit from Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s ruling Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). 

Bersama founder Tan Gin Theam handed over the registration certificate. Several other PKR MPs attended in support, including Mr Wong Chen, Mr Lee Chean Chung, Ms Rodziah Ismail, Mr S. Kesavan, Mr Zahir Hassan and Datuk Bakhtiar Wan Chik. 

The event marked a dramatic schism in Malaysian politics that was long in the making. Mr Rafizi and Mr Nik Nazmi announced that they would resign from PKR and vacate their Pandan and Setiawangsa constituencies. 

Describing the move as a “kamikaze mission”, Mr Rafizi – who broke away from PKR after losing a bitter battle for its deputy presidency – said it was risky but necessary. He positioned Bersama as a multiracial platform committed to reform, universal social protections, economic growth and youth participation. The party’s symbol, the sang kancil (mousedeer), was designed to evoke agility and cunning against larger political rivals. Mr Rafizi also vowed that Bersama would contest the next general election independently, fielding candidates against seats held by both the government and the opposition. 

The launch immediately generated intense discussion online and raised a larger question: Could Bersama become the credible third force that Malaysian politics has long lacked, distinguishing itself from both the government and the traditional opposition parties? 

Masterstroke in timing and political theatre

The timing of Bersama’s launch was politically astute, allowing Mr Rafizi to seize the narrative and create a contrast with the ruling political coalition. It coincided with Pakatan Harapan’s national convention in Johor Bahru, where Datuk Seri Anwar delivered a keynote address on coalition strategy and preparations for the next general election. 

As a result, much of the political conversation, especially on social media, shifted towards Mr Rafizi’s move rather than PH’s convention. The contrast reinforced Mr Rafizi’s longstanding reputation as one of Malaysia’s most effective political communicators and campaign strategists. 

Bersama’s appeal lies in its effort to occupy the same reformist, multiracial political space as PKR while presenting itself as gutsy, ground-up and less compromised. The party’s digital-first approach to membership recruitment also signals a focus on building rapid grassroots momentum among younger and urban voters.

Bersama believes the time is ripe to challenge PH’s pole position in the political landscape. A large segment of the ruling coalition’s traditional support base has grown increasingly disillusioned with the Malaysian government. Many progressive voters believe Mr Anwar has delayed promised reforms to win Malay-Muslim support and maintain coalition stability. In the 2022 General Election, PH captured only about 10 per cent of the Malay/Muslim vote.

Criticism intensified in last year’s PKR deputy presidency contest in which Mr Anwar’s daughter, Ms Nurul Izzah, defeated Mr Rafizi. To critics, the episode reinforced perceptions of dynastic politics within PKR and deepened frustrations among reform-minded supporters. Many in PKR are also disappointed that Mr Anwar did not make a deal for Mr Rafizi to stay in the party.

At the same time, allegations of political retaliation – including scrutiny of Mr Rafizi’s ministerial contracts – further widened the rift between Mr Rafizi’s faction and the PKR leadership.

Rafizi still matters

Bersama’s emergence raises questions about the future configuration of Malaysian politics ahead of GE16, which must be held by February 2028 but could come much earlier.

Bersama’s supporters say it is trying to revive the reformist energy associated with the early Reformasi movement – before what critics describe as the compromises of governing power. Mr Rafizi remains one of the architects most closely associated with PH’s electoral breakthrough in 2018 and 2022. His reputation built on data-driven campaigning, social media outreach and an ability to tackle otherwise technocratic and technical issues with politically resonant narratives.

The party is likely to attract urban and middle-class voters who are dissatisfied with the centrist PH’s pace of reforms but unwilling to back the more right-wing opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional, which includes the conservative Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS).

Bersama could also appeal to Chinese and Indian voters, as well as young Malay Malaysians who are not drawn to PAS and its politics of exclusivism. But while Mr Rafizi’s brand of liberal, progressive and inclusive politics may be a draw for young working professionals, it remains unclear whether Bersama can make inroads into Malay-majority, semi-urban and rural constituencies where identity politics remains highly influential. This remains the central test that determines whether Bersama can go beyond being a PKR splinter party or an urban protest platform and become a national force in Malaysian politics.

The immediate question is whether Bersama can convert the spike in interest into mobilisation and recruitment – to translate digital sign-ups into local networks capable of supporting campaigning seat by seat across the country, and secure more defections from PKR MPs and state leaders, to create momentum around Bersama. Under current electoral law (Federal Constitution Article 54), with less than two years to go until the term’s automatic end, by-elections would not be required for vacated seats. 

Bersama will also not be able to shy away from building a broader coalition, as Mr Rafizi was quick to admit. Malaysia’s fragmented political landscape makes it nearly impossible for any single party to secure a parliamentary majority on its own in the next general election. 

Bersama’s concerns will be less about winning outright power from PH (or keeping Perikatan Nasional’s rising influence at bay, for that matter) and more about positioning itself as a kingmaker, able to influence coalition formation after the election. Here, an electoral pact with other parties such as the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance and Bersama’s ability to attract defectors from the Democratic Action Party or the opposition coalition Barisan Nasional will add to its value proposition as an important partner in any future government.

Look east

If Mr Rafizi is serious about building Bersama into a credible third force in Malaysian politics, he must focus Bersama on strategic partnerships with East Malaysia. A public commitment to fulfilling the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), coupled with a pledge not to expand into Sabah and Sarawak, could earn substantial goodwill among the Bornean parties.

Political parties in Sabah and Sarawak do not owe any loyalty to Mr Anwar and will quite happily switch their support to anyone who can deliver on MA63 promises. The East Malaysian parties supported PH in forming the federal government in 2018, switched their support to a PN government in 2020 and then back to a PH government in 2022.

Such an approach recognises the political reality that East Malaysian parties are likely to remain indispensable to the formation of the next federal ruling coalition. With there being 222 seats in the Malaysian Parliament and 57 of them held by East Malaysian parties, Bersama would do well to focus on winning peninsula seats. This would allow the party to concentrate limited resources on the peninsula while maximising any leverage it may have in a hung Parliament scenario.

Mr Rafizi possesses many of the ingredients necessary to build a serious political movement: strategic acumen, policy credibility, communication skills and name recognition. But Malaysian politics has repeatedly shown how difficult it is for third-force movements to survive. Much will depend on whether Bersama can sustain media momentum, build a powerful grassroots machinery, attract credible coalition partners and broaden its appeal beyond urban, reformist and youth voters. 

Its rise could go either way: pressuring PH to reclaim a stronger reform agenda, or splitting the anti-PH vote and unintentionally weakening Mr Anwar’s rivals. Regardless, Bersama’s emergence has already exposed tensions within PKR and reopened questions about the future direction of the Reformasi movement.

One thing, however, has already become clear: If Mr Anwar’s coalition struggles in the next general election, observers may look back on May 17, 2026, as a pivotal moment – not necessarily because Bersama won power, but because the split accelerated the fragmentation of Malaysia’s reformist bloc.