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G-20 presidency and Indonesia's diplomacy: Jakarta Post contributor
The writer says the challenge for Indonesia is how to construe its G-20 presidency in the perspective of diplomacy and foreign policy.
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Indonesia's President Joko Widodo presents his statement at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow on Nov 1, 2021.
PHOTO: REUTERS
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JAKARTA (THE JAKARTA POST/ASIA NEWS NETWORK) - In his remarks upon unveiling Indonesia's Group of 20 (G-20) presidency, President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo emphasised three main priorities: inclusive health care, digital-based transformation and the transition to sustainable energy.
During its presidency, which started Dec 1, Indonesia wants members of the world's 20 largest economies to take concrete steps to realise the three priorities beyond rhetoric and ceremonial manner. The challenge for Indonesia is therefore how to construe the G-20 presidency in the perspective of diplomacy and foreign policy.
The big theme of Indonesia's G-20 presidency - recover together, recover stronger - carries an important message, which is intertwined with the dynamics of current international politics. This, for example, is manifested in the priority goal of inclusive health care, which came on the heels of feuds among countries since the early days of the pandemic.
The pandemic has witnessed at least three dynamics that affect the mood of international politics. First, when Covid-19 began to spread globally, the United States and China accused each other of being the origin of the wretched virus.
Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has intensified the global power rivalry, which takes shape not only in diplomatic manoeuvring, particularly in medical equipment and vaccines supplies, but also penetrates into the realm of ideology. When the West was grappling with the Covid-19 spread in mid-March 2020 - only three months after the discovery of the coronavirus - China declared victory over the pandemic.
China has built a grand narrative that it has succeeded in defeating Covid-19 in a unified, strong, effective and efficient way, thanks to a single party political system, as against liberal democracy, which is considered slow, noisy and panicked in making decisions.
In the context of values and ideals, the US-China rivalry is driven by ideological competition and the system of government: between democracy and authoritarianism (Matthew Kroenig, "The Power Delusion", Foreign Policy, Nov. 11, 2020). Complex rivalries can hinder international cooperation in fighting the pandemic.
Second, the emergence of nationalism in medical equipment and vaccines. Most countries were frantic about Covid-19 when it first spread out. To save themselves, the states banned exports of medical equipment and diverted medical equipment shipments from one country to another.
Due to the "me first" political mantra the European Union failed to devise a joint action to help Italy, which was hit hardest by the pandemic in the European region. This spiritual atmosphere of relations between countries is not conducive to international cooperation against Covid-19.
Third, the unequal distribution of vaccines. When supplies of medical equipment are secured, a new problem arises: vaccine distribution. The EU and the United Kingdom have accused each other of banning the export of the AstraZeneca vaccine.
Although AstraZeneca belongs to the UK and Sweden, the EU claims it has the right to decide destinations of the vaccine, which is produced in Leiden (Netherlands) and in Anagni (Italy). The EU's reasoning is understandable because it wants to meet the vaccine needs of its member countries. Unfortunately, the UK has also banned distribution of AstraZeneca produced in Wrexham and Oxford to the Eurozone unless its domestic needs are met.
The nationalistic attitude has resulted in acute unequal access to vaccines. Director general of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Tedros A. Ghebreyesus said vaccine nationalism was not only morally indefensible, but epidemiologically it would destroy others.
Just to illustrate, rich countries whose population accounts for only 16 percent of the world's population have purchased more than 60 per cent of the global vaccines in store. In contrast, according to Tedros, poor countries have to fight to get a vaccine for 20 per cent of the population by the end of 2021.
With this glaring inequality, cooperation between rich and poor countries is a necessity. Therefore, prioritisation of inclusive health care to combat Covid-19 finds its relevance. This is the main challenge for Indonesia's G-20 presidency: To ensure vaccines are distributed evenly to all countries.
The question is whether Indonesia can fulfil the mandate.
Theoretically, a country's ability to deliver its international mandate depends on its power and influence. Today, there is a shift in the concept of power. Power is no longer defined as military power and the structural hierarchy of relations between countries.
The new concept related to power is introduced, namely metapower (Peter Fisk, Soft Power Megatrend, Global Soft Power Index, 2020). According to Fisk, metapower is not gained through a great military, but results from a good reputation. Meta power is obtained because of contribution to a better, healthier and happier world community.
The keywords are "reputation" and "contribution" to the world. How about Indonesia?
In the fight against the pandemic developing countries face difficulties in accessing vaccines. It is precisely in these two areas - developing countries and vaccines - that Indonesia's diplomacy has made reputation and contribution.
First, in international politics and diplomacy, Indonesia is pioneering the struggle for independence among developing countries or colonised nations. Indonesia initiated the 1955 Asian-African Conference, a milestone in the history of Indonesia's diplomacy and foreign policy. Through this phenomenal conference the voice of the colonised nation was echoed.
The result was obvious. After the conference many colonised countries gained their independence. It is clear that Indonesia has a reputation for and made a contribution to fighting for the interests of developing countries. Indonesia is sensitive to capture the hearts of developing countries to fight for on a global level. And now Indonesia's reputation and sensitivity unfolds in its diplomatic moves to deal with the pandemic.
Second, in light of providing vaccines for developing countries, Indonesia has the credential to launch vaccine diplomacy at the global level. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, together with the Ethiopian health minister and the Canadian minister of international development cooperation, cochairs the Covax (Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access) Facility, a vaccine procurement and allocation program under the WHO for all countries.
Through the Covax Facility, Indonesia can demonstrate its diplomatic clout to ensure equitable distribution and access to vaccines for all countries so that at least 20 per cent of the population (according to WHO standards) can be vaccinated.
With its reputation and contribution to the developing countries as well as its role as cochair of Covax, Indonesia can realise the priority of inclusive health care as mandated by the G-20 presidency.
- The writer teaches international relations at the School of Social and Political Sciences, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, and is a former Indonesian ambassador to Austria and the United Nations (2017-2021). The Jakarta Post is a member of The Straits Times media partner Asia News Network, an alliance of 23 news media organisations.


