North Korea may pursue active diplomacy after ruling party congress in 2026

Emerging from years of isolation, North Korea may pursue active diplomacy in 2026, including the

resumption of dialogue between leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump

after a ruling party congress expected to be held early in 2026.

Some North Korean watchers foresee the next congress, which should convene once every five years and is considered the supreme organ of the Workers’ Party of Korea, will adopt the policy of further bolstering the country’s defence capabilities and decide on an important diplomatic strategy.

Speculation on Pyongyang’s proactive foreign policy stance is rife after Mr Kim debuted on the multilateral diplomatic scene by

attending a military parade in Beijing

on Sept 3 to mark the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin among others.

In October, North Korea staged its own military parade in Pyongyang to commemorate the 80th anniversary of its ruling party, at which time Mr Kim hosted foreign dignitaries including Chinese Premier Li Qiang, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Vietnamese leader To Lam.

Mr Chad O’Carroll, CEO of Korea Risk Group, a consulting firm specialising in Korean Peninsula affairs, said North Korea’s diplomacy with the United States remains possible mainly at the leaders’ level, adding a Trump-Kim meeting is “plausible but more likely” after Pyongyang “consolidates its strategic line” at the party congress.

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Mr Trump has expressed willingness to re-engage with Mr Kim following their three summits between 2018 and 2019 during Mr Trump’s first term.

But a meeting did not materialise during the US president’s Asia tour last autumn, with Pyongyang showing no reaction.

During the upcoming congress, the date of which has yet to be announced, Pyongyang is widely expected to declare the completion of the five-year national defence plan adopted during the previous party gathering in January 2021 and advocate the policy of simultaneously promoting the development of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The existing five-year plan covers the

diversification of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal

and the development of hypersonic weapons, military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines among other goals.

Under the simultaneous weapons development policy, Pyongyang will likely focus on tactical nuclear warheads that could be used in a contingency with South Korea as well as the modernisation of conventional armed forces including drones, Mr O’Carroll said.

“Having significantly strengthened its nuclear deterrent, it would make strategic sense for Pyongyang to place greater emphasis on conventional capabilities, which are better suited to deterring and responding to low-level military contingencies,” said Mr Tong Zhao, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The simultaneous policy will come as inter-Korean tensions remain, with Pyongyang framing the two countries as “hostile to each other”, despite South Korean President Lee Jae Myung presenting a conciliatory posture.

Still, Professor Noboru Yamaguchi, visiting professor at the International University of Japan, cast doubt on the possibility that North Korea could significantly modernise its conventional weapons to keep up with the standards of South Korea, citing its weak economy and priorities so far given to nuclear and missile development.

Professor Shunji Hiraiwa, professor at Nanzan University, said he believes Pyongyang had resolved not to engage in dialogue with the United States while the five-year defence plan was in place, instead turning to Russia as a cooperation partner.

In recent years, Pyongyang and Moscow have strengthened their partnership, especially in the military field, with

North Korean troops dispatched to aid Russia

in its war against Ukraine and Russian military technology believed to have been provided to North Korea.

Prof Hiraiwa said Pyongyang’s alignment with Moscow was also aimed at rebalancing its relations with China, North Korea’s major economic benefactor on which Pyongyang was heavily dependent, so that it can secure the backing of both Moscow and Beijing in the international arena.

“Through its achievements in the five-year defence plan, North Korea must have confidence in its greatly improved nuclear capabilities. The country has also successfully obtained support from both Russia and China, setting the stage for Pyongyang to face off with the United States,” the Nanzan University professor said.

With Mr Trump expected to revisit Asia in April for talks with Chinese President Xi, Prof Hiraiwa said the chances are high that a Trump-Kim meeting will take place after the US-China summit because the American president sees managing relations with the Asian powerhouse as the most pressing matter.

As for the goals of the possible US-North Korea talks, Mr Zhao of the Washington-based think tank said Mr Trump may move toward “more limited objectives” rather than the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, as Russia and China have effectively accepted Pyongyang’s nuclear status.

“Renewed summitry would serve Kim’s strategic interests by further reducing North Korea’s international isolation, advancing the normalisation of its nuclear status, mitigating perceived US threats and creating more favourable conditions for long-term economic development by easing sanctions pressure,” Mr Zhao said.

Mr O’Carroll said if a Trump-Kim meeting happens, “substantive convergence would still be difficult, making an early summit more likely to be political than transformational”.

During Mr Trump’s first presidency, the US-North Korea denuclearisation talks collapsed when the two leaders met in Hanoi in 2019 following their first meeting in Singapore the previous year, as they failed to bridge the gap between US demands and North Korea’s call for sanctions relief.

Prof Hiraiwa pointed out that once the US-North Korea dialogue resumes, it may be possible that inter-Korean talks and contact between Pyongyang and Tokyo will follow suit if conditions are met.

North Korea has refused to hold dialogue with Japan if Tokyo brings up the country’s past abductions of Japanese nationals, an issue Pyongyang maintains has already been resolved.

But North Korea may be inclined to engage with the government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who enjoys relatively high support rate, to secure financial aid from Japan, he said.

In approaching the country, Pyongyang may use the Asian Games to be co-hosted by Aichi Prefecture and its capital Nagoya in September and October as an opportunity to push forward relations with Tokyo, Prof Hiraiwa said.

“Depending on the situation at that time, North Korea may make the most of the sporting event to improve ties with Japan, as it has a precedent of moving forward inter-Korean relations on the occasion of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics” in 2018, the professor said. KYODO NEWS