Ground stop highlights chronic vulnerabilities in US air traffic system
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The Nov 13 ground stop raised questions about whether the federal authorities have done enough to create backup systems.
PHOTO: AFP
Karoun Demirjian
- The Nov 13 US ground stop exposed deep flaws in the FAA’s ageing air traffic system, after overloaded communications lines failed and halted flights nationwide.
- Recent outages have kept causing delays, with fibre cuts, circuit failures and no strong backup systems showing the network still lacks enough redundancy.
- The crisis has sparked blame in Washington, with Sean Duffy seeking US$50 billion for upgrades while lawmakers question how well current funds have been used.
AI generated
WASHINGTON – The nationwide ground stop that brought air travel across the United States to a halt on Nov 13 has highlighted persistent weaknesses in the Federal Aviation Administration’s ageing air traffic control infrastructure that has had several disruptive failures in recent months.
Officials called the rare ground stop after outdated communications lines became overloaded and began to fail, interrupting communication lines between air traffic controllers and pilots, according to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin.
The breakdown occurred less than two months after a circuit failure and severed fibre optic cable caused crippling ground stops and delays at airports along the East Coast. Smaller outages unfolded in October at Raleigh-Durham International Airport in North Carolina and George Bush International Airport in Houston, when contractors accidentally cut into fibre line.
The Nov 13 ground stop, which was only the third the FAA has issued this century, eclipsed the fallout of previous air traffic communications equipment failures. The FAA has yet to identify precisely what caused communication lines to falter.
But the successive episodes have underscored the structural vulnerabilities that continue to hamper air traffic controllers’ ability to safely manage flight traffic, even after concerted efforts to make improvements. And they raised questions about whether the federal authorities have done enough to create backup systems and redundancies to prevent disruptive or even catastrophic failures.
For decades, air traffic communications have relied on a system that runs on analog copper wire, floppy disks and alphabetical keyboards so old that the FAA has difficulty sourcing spare parts. In 2025, Congress approved US$12.5 billion (S$16.1 billion) in funding to help pay for upgrades, after a series of outages in an air traffic control facilities, including the one serving Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, caused alarming losses of radar and other communications capabilities.
Earlier in November, L3 Harris, the primary telecoms contractor tasked to manage the system upgrades, boasted on its website that it had converted about 70% of the copper line to fiber optic cable; last week, the FAA. announced it would begin to phase out floppy disks.
But the disruptions in recent weeks showed that those upgrades had serious vulnerabilities themselves.
In September, when a circuit at a regional air traffic facility failed, operators had no backup options beyond the fiber line, 600 feet of which they discovered – to their surprise – had been severed by a construction crew in New Jersey working on Amtrak project. More than 430 flights were canceled before the system was fixed several hours later.
A similar incident occurred in October at the Raleigh-Durham International Airport in North Carolina, when a contractor working on plumbing accidentally severed a fiber line. The airport was forced to issue a ground stop for several hours. Just one day after that, officials were forced to issue a ground stop at George Bush International Airport, when yet another contractor inadvertently severed a fiber line.
The fibre line upgrades themselves, Bryan Bedford, the FAA administrator, told reporters at the time, were not enough to save the system from failure.
Ideally, the FAA wanted to put data into cloud services, he told reporters then, so that “when you have a fiber cut, you have multiple pathways of backup.”
“Today we have physical fibre and when it’s cut, there’s one redundancy, and when we lose that, there’s no more redundancy,” he added.
The Nov 13 national ground stop revealed that the lack of redundancies in the FAA’s system could trigger catastrophic failures in other ways and touched off a blame game in Washington. Duffy seized on the chaos to hammer Congress, saying it had failed to pony up enough funding to pay for systemwide upgrades.
“How many more times does this have to happen for Congress to give the money to fix it?” he told reporters at the White House on Nov 13 night, asking that lawmakers approve US$50 billion in emergency funds for the project. Their lack of action, he said, had forced his department to pursue patchwork upgrades that were insufficient. It was a dramatic increase in his demand for additional money, which for the past several months has hovered at US$30 billion.
But lawmakers in both parties are raising questions about how efficiently Duffy and the FAA have been spending the money they have already been given.
“Today’s unprecedented breakdown is the latest in a series of unacceptable air travel incidents under the Trump administration’s failed leadership,” Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, the minority leader, said in a statement issued shortly after Duffy’s news conference, accusing the administration of failing to take responsibility for its failures in “the latest in a series of unacceptable air travel incidents.” NYTIMES
This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
