What the great powers demand of Singapore

Singapore has long kept good ties with both the US and China. But as their rivalry deepens, the pressure to choose sides will come in the form of specific demands – and in a war, they may arrive all at once.

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US–China rivalry now reaches into our security arrangements, markets, technology and supply chains, and makes that dependence harder to manage.

The US–China rivalry now reaches into our security arrangements, markets, technology and supply chains, and makes that dependence harder to manage.

PHOTO: REUTERS

Ng Chee Khern

On Nov 16, Washington named Singapore as one of five countries – with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Brazil – to which advanced AI chips can now be exported only under an American licence, citing a “higher-than-normal risk of diversion”.

The rule is aimed at China, but it falls on us. Decisions taken elsewhere can narrow our room to choose. In 1965, the main threats to our sovereignty came from next door. Today, they also come from our relationships with the US and China.

Sovereignty is the right to choose. Statecraft makes the choice real. For a small state like ours, making the choice real is difficult, because we depend on others for so much and have little room for error. The US-China rivalry now reaches into our security arrangements, markets, technology and supply chains, and makes that dependence harder to manage.

These pressures are unlikely to be temporary. They arise from a contest with deep roots in power, history and incompatible ambitions.

Why the contest runs deep

China’s rise has greatly narrowed the gap in power with the US. In manufacturing output, and in GDP measured at purchasing power parity, China is already ahead. Its navy is now the world’s largest by number of ships, and the Pentagon estimates that its nuclear arsenal could exceed 1,000 operational warheads by 2030.

That shift explains much of the competition, but not the depth of suspicion. China’s history also shapes how it reads American intentions.

Chinese history can be read as a repeated cycle of unity, fragmentation and restoration. The lesson China’s leaders draw is that disorder makes China weak, and a weak China is open to foreign interference, even conquest. That fear helps explain why Beijing reads American support for Taiwan, criticism over Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and promotion of democracy as a connected effort to weaken Communist Party rule and divide China.

American expectations developed differently. For decades, Americans hoped engagement would make China more open at home and more accommodating abroad. Instead, China became more authoritarian within China and assertive internationally. The disappointment helped harden American policy, which Beijing in turn saw as evidence of hostile intent.

These suspicions are reinforced by aims that cannot both be met. In technology, neither side believes it can afford to lose. In May 2018, President Xi Jinping told China’s leading scientists that core technologies must be built at home and not by begging. In September 2022, then National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the US must keep “as large of a lead as possible” in foundational technologies such as advanced chips. Today, both states intend to win in artificial intelligence. As Trump has put it, “whoever wins AI, wins”.

Better understanding would help, but it would not reconcile these ambitions. The US wants to stay ahead, and China will not accept being kept behind. Cooperation can reduce the risk of conflict, but cannot remove it where the rivalry overlaps with unresolved disputes.

Where the contest could turn to war

In East Asia, that risk is heightened by the overlap between local disputes and the two powers’ military positions. Japan and the Philippines are US treaty allies, and Taiwan is a close security partner. Each has an unresolved dispute with China: over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, in the South China Sea, and across the Taiwan Strait.

Behind these sovereignty disputes lies a wider contest over whose armed forces may operate where and how freely. American allies and partners sit along most of the first island chain, which runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. To Beijing, these are potentially hostile forces close to its coast, overlooking vital sea routes and making it harder for its nuclear-armed submarines to reach the Pacific undetected. China wants American forces farther away. The US wants to keep them where they are, with its allies.

America’s insistence on staying goes back to Pearl Harbour. In 1941, it learnt that to prevent an attack on America itself, it needed forward bases and forces in East Asia.

Taiwan, at the centre of the chain, comes first for both. Chinese control of the island would make it much harder for the US and its allies to constrain China’s navy, and a forcible takeover would test confidence in American support elsewhere. The political divide compounds the danger: Beijing seeks unification, while a growing share of people in Taiwan identify as Taiwanese only. If Beijing concludes that time is working against it, it will find it harder to wait.

Both powers are preparing for a major war, while signalling that they do not want one. Yet the same American commitments that help deter attacks on allies and partners could draw the US into conflict if deterrence fails. To avoid being seen to abandon them, the US could find itself fighting over islands on whose sovereignty it takes no position, or over Taiwan without a formal treaty.

What the contest means for South-east Asia

Settling the sovereignty disputes would not remove the military importance of the region’s waters or end the two powers’ contest over access and influence. The regional balance of power determines how much room smaller countries have to choose.

That is why the continued American presence matters to Singapore. We do not want any single power to dominate our region, and the US is the only power that can realistically balance China. When both are present, each has a reason to court us. When one dominates, we can be taken for granted.

Singapore has kept good relations with both powers and avoided an alliance with the US. We cannot afford to give up either relationship: The US is our largest foreign investor, and China was our largest trading partner from 2013 to 2024. But good relations alone will not keep our options open if either power insists on decisions it regards as a test of loyalty.

What the powers will demand of us

Those tests would probably come as specific requests rather than a single demand to choose a side. They could take at least five forms.

The first is military access. An operating military needs ports, airfields, fuel, repair facilities and the freedom to move people and equipment. The rival power may demand the opposite: that we refuse such access.

The second is whether we accept another power’s rules on economic and technological security. A specific restriction, such as the AI-chip rule, can be judged on its merits. A promise to follow rules not yet written cannot. The US-Malaysia reciprocal trade agreement, signed in October 2025, ties trade benefits to cooperation on export controls and economic security, including restrictions the US may adopt in future. 

The third is the suppliers we exclude. In January 2020, Britain decided to let Huawei supply part of its 5G network. Six months later, after Washington cut Huawei off from chips made with American technology and pressed London hard, Britain ordered all Huawei equipment removed by 2027. In 2022, Washington also persuaded the consortium building the SEA-ME-WE 6 cable from Singapore to France to drop its Chinese contractor.

The fourth is which laws our firms obey when two countries’ laws conflict. A Singapore bank could face American penalties for a transaction covered by US sanctions, and civil claims under China’s 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law for complying with them.

The fifth is the diplomatic positions we take: how we vote in international bodies, what language we accept in joint statements, and which groupings we join. Once we have taken a position, it becomes a standard by which our future behaviour is judged, and a precedent others will cite next time.

The difficulty is that these decisions do not remain separate. In ordinary competition, demands arrive one at a time, over years, and each answer may be sound on its own. We may sincerely believe we have not taken sides, but each power may add up our answers and conclude that we chose a side long ago.

Australia learnt this. Between 2016 and 2018, it backed the arbitral ruling on the South China Sea, declined to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative, dropped an extradition treaty with China, legislated against foreign interference, and barred Huawei and ZTE from its 5G network. Each decision had its own reasons, but Beijing read them together. Graham Fletcher, formerly Australia’s ambassador in Beijing, has said that Chinese officials often assumed Canberra was acting for Washington. When Australia called in April 2020 for an international inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, China cut off political contact and restricted Australian exports, from barley to wine. 

In war, several such demands could arrive together within days. Delay, ambiguity and treating each request separately would be harder to sustain. We might reserve the formal right to refuse, while finding that the costs made refusal scarcely a real option.

We did not choose this contest, and we cannot end it. What we can decide is whether we build the means to withstand it: the defence, economic resilience and institutional capability that let us bear the costs of an independent decision.

We have done this before. In 1968, when Britain announced it would withdraw its forces by 1971, we had about three years to replace the defence they provided and the income from their bases, which made up about a fifth of our national income. We did not complain that the task was unfair. We built. Today’s pressures are different, and in some ways greater. But the answer is the same: capability, built in advance, and the will to use it. That is how statecraft makes the choice real.

  • Ng Chee Khern is director and CEO of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and IPS’ 19th S R Nathan Fellow. This commentary is adapted from the first of his three IPS-Nathan Lectures, delivered on Nov 16, 2026.

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