It took a virus to clear the fog around the arguments about how societies should be governed. It took a virus to showcase the dangers of outsourcing social obligations to the private sector. It took a virus to pierce the decades-long presumption in the West that the state needed to get out of the way and allow markets to address social needs.
The mainstream Western view on the government's role was largely settled before the pandemic. The government should not intervene in the economy. As much as possible, services should be handled by the private sector, with government focusing on a (very small) set of essential goods and services. The private sector was far more agile than the government in dealing with the future, meaning the government needed to get out of the way of innovators, inventors and financiers.
This view has come crashing down. In a pandemic, everything needs to be state-managed.
Nor are these changes going to go away. As The Economist notes, history suggests that "the state is likely to play a very different role in the economy - not just during the crisis, but long after".
WHAT IS A STRONG STATE?
But what does it mean to have a strong state? It is not, as some are prone to argue, the same as an authoritarian one.
Governments resort to coercion and controls not out of strength, but out of weakness: Dictators and strongmen resort to force when their other attempts to govern society and secure their own positions fail. At the same time, a weak state can be one in which its leaders and institutions are captive to private interests and examples are to be found in democratic and non-democratic states.
Though they have some similarities, the strong state is also not the same thing as "big government", that is, a large public sector. A large public sector often means that the state contributes or manages a large portion of a county's gross domestic product, but that investment need not actually go towards the public good.
Many countries - developed and developing - have public sectors that manage natural resources, key economic sectors and "strategic" products, yet often these end up as avenues for corruption and rent-seeking.
The strong state is represented not by the numbers of its police or soldiers, nor by the largesse of its state-owned companies, but rather by the strength of its society.
STRONG SOCIETY
In a 21st century confronted with existential threats, we need to think of the strong state as a strong society. Institutions and other social groups have clear roles, responsibilities and expectations, and have obligations towards one another. Strong social and community solidarity means that social goals sometimes override individual or organisational interests. The government, for its part, helps set the agenda and marshals resources.
The value of state strength and a strong society can be seen in the places that have handled their outbreaks well. South Korea shows the government's agenda-setting and resource-marshalling responsibility can be critical in a crisis. Its mass testing, combined with tracking and isolating confirmed cases and their close contacts, has allowed it to control its outbreak and keep deaths low.
When the outbreak began, South Korea's biotech companies were asked by the government to quickly produce diagnostic tests. Production rapidly increased, which gave the Moon administration greater information with which to make public health decisions. The focus on producing testing capacity is now potentially paying dividends, with South Korea now exporting coronavirus test kits to other hard-hit countries. Contrast this with the United States, where there is open competition to produce essential medical products and even a vaccine, with the state unwilling or unable to marshal its formidable resources around a common cause.
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
Strong states are also marked by a broad array of competent institutions, trusted by the public. This allows confidence in public directives to persist even as political leadership changes.
Hong Kong shows the importance of institutional trust. Public polling shows that a large majority of Hong Kong people disapprove of the city's political leadership. Upon the epidemic's outset, many outside observers expressed concern that this would affect the government's ability to have its public health directives followed.
But while many Hong Kong people may have disapproved of their government, they still trusted the medical experts and public health departments. Nor were public health directives polarised between the city's two different political camps, something that has not happened in other polarised societies like the US. Combined with the pro-social attitude of Hong Kong people, the city has been able to, at least at the time of writing, suppress its outbreak.
Finally, China is an example of the kinds of drastic action states may need to take in an emergency. While arguably slow at first, China's actions were broad and widespread. Its lockdown of Wuhan seemed drastic at the time, but is now the model for how a country can reassert control once an outbreak has begun.
A strong state should be viewed as a strong society and in China, the unity of purpose within society was reflected in the manner in which the population backed the state's actions.
Vietnam, which is not often spoken about in the context of the pandemic, is an example of a poor country where swift, bold and aggressive actions by the state as early as January ensured it has one of the lowest infection rates globally. Success depended on the participation of a willing population that respects and trusts the authority of the state.
In contrast, the US' mistakes in handling the coronavirus outbreak show some of the issues that come from a weak state. Months into the pandemic, the country is still struggling with the choice between controlling the outbreak and "reopening the economy". The societal divisions created by decades-long and deeply entrenched ideological differences sowed the seeds for a weak state.
Few countries are as chaotic as the US, but most countries have made similar mistakes of communication and coordination. Britain, for example, dithered on passing strong social distancing measures for fear of disrupting the economy, and opted out of working with the European Union when sourcing supplies.
A warning against complacency comes from Singapore, which appeared to have the coronavirus under control until just a few weeks ago. Singapore is often described as a strong state, where society trusts the Government to work towards providing universal basic needs such as housing and medical care. And, up until quite recently, this competence worked to control the outbreak.
Despite the spike in cases, it appears that most Singaporeans still trust the Government to make the right decisions concerning the coronavirus: again, showing the value of the trust built up over generations. But there is little doubt that the lessons learnt from this will translate into tough new rules and regulations that over time will become best practice and wholly supported by the population. Singapore is a good example of how to think about a strong state as a strong society.
STATES' AGENDA-SETTING ROLE
The pandemic teaches us the importance of a strong state, backed by competent and trusted institutions, social solidarity and clear expectations and obligations. Societies need to be reshaped to have a more sustainable balance between the state, the market and the individual, and rebuild state strength.
It is important to note that a strong state is not necessarily mutually exclusive with a vibrant private sector, even in times of crisis. But this is where the state's agenda-setting capability comes into play.
China, due to its consistent intervention in its economy, was able to rapidly increase production of not just personal protective equipment, but also tests and medical equipment. The same can be said for the governments of South Korea and Taiwan, who marshalled their manufacturers to switch to necessary products.
In contrast, the US - despite having a great deal of manufacturing, medical and technical expertise - has been unable to pull together a national effort to increase production of necessary equipment.
The invisible hand of the market will not deliver on social aims, whether short term or long term, on its own. A strong state needs to play a guiding role, and a strong society, with strong, trusted and competent institutions, may need to decide to limit individual interests in order to achieve some broader objectives. The strongest societies do this automatically, where individuals and organisations act in pro-social ways in advance of government directives.
In the medium term, a strong state and society will be able to chart a path out of the current crisis, ensuring that people and businesses are able to emerge from lockdowns in a manner that preserves public health and resisting efforts from some vested interests to open earlier than they should.
And finally, in the long term, a strong state and society would be able to use these tools and mechanisms to solve other pressing social and economic issues, including the thorniest issue of all: climate change.
• Chandran Nair is the founder and chief executive of the Global Institute For Tomorrow, an independent think-tank based in Hong Kong.
