Bangladesh’s increasingly hardline religious currents pose deep social challenges
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Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman seen here waving to supporters during campaigning in February.
ST PHOTO: REDWAN AHMED
Redwan Ahmed for The Straits Times
- Bangladesh faces rising hardline religious rhetoric and extremist views, especially since political changes in 2024, impacting social cohesion and freedom of expression.
- Economic frustration and youth unemployment contribute to vulnerability among young Bangladeshis, who are susceptible to extremist narratives spread online and in communities.
- The government pledges to fight extremism, but challenges remain in balancing religious politics and preventing violence while protecting pluralism and rights.
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DHAKA – Singapore’s repatriation of two Bangladeshi construction workers in early July over extremist social media posts has renewed scrutiny over whether hardline religious ideas are gaining wider acceptance in Bangladesh.
These cases follow the 2025 arrest of 36 Bangladeshi migrant workers in Malaysia over suspected Islamic State links, and a nationwide terror alert issued by Bangladesh police in April 2026.
Bangladeshi police detained the two repatriated workers from Singapore when they landed in Dhaka on July 8. A Dhaka court remanded them in police custody while investigations continue on their links to militant organisations, State Prosecutor Muhammad Shamsud Doha told The Straits Times.
The police have not yet named any specific organisations linked to the men and no judicial determinations have been made.
Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) said on July 17 that Tayani Md Risad, 25, had expressed support for radical Islamist writer and preacher Shafiur Rahman Farabi, while Islam Sahedul, 37, had posted inflammatory comments on the Israel-Iran conflict and described Muslims who opposed Islamic law as infidels. ISD found no indication of attack plans or terrorist activity in Singapore, but deemed their views harmful to social cohesion.
Increasing visibility of hardline religious rhetoric
Hardline religious rhetoric has become more visible both online and in public life in Bangladesh since the 2024 uprising ended former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s rule, creating greater political space for Islamist actors.
In May 2025, Islamist groups led by Hefazat-e-Islam – an influential conservative movement rooted in madrasah networks – staged large-scale protests against recommendations by the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission, set up by Muhammad Yunus’ interim government that oversaw the political transition of Bangladesh following Hasina’s ouster. The proposals were not adopted.
Freedom of expression is also under strain. A prominent poet, Sohel Hasan Galib, was jailed in February 2025 over allegations of blasphemous writing, with calls for his killing. Writers and rights groups condemned the case as a threat to literary freedom.
An April assessment by the International Crisis Group found that political uncertainty and weak law enforcement had made extremist mobilisation easier, although acts of physical violence remained rare.
While there is no evidence for broad support for jihadist violence or for transnational terrorism, the increasing visible expressions of hardline religious sentiments nevertheless raise serious societal concerns over unchecked extremist sentiments and narratives.
Asif Bin Ali, a doctoral fellow at Georgia State University, said the shift reflected both the re-emergence of suppressed views under Sheikh Hasina’s rule and the spread of extremist narratives to new audiences.
“I would not say violent extremism has become mainstream,” he said. “But some ideas once confined to the fringes have become more visible and, in some circles, more socially acceptable.”
Public mobilisation offers some evidence of this shift. In March 2025, an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 people joined a “March for Khilafat” – calling for the establishment of a caliphate in Bangladesh – organised by banned Hizb ut-Tahrir in Dhaka.
The group, outlawed since 2009 for advocating a transnational Islamic caliphate, remains active despite police dispersing the rally and arresting several participants.
Islamist hardline pressure has also begun to shape social and cultural life, leading some organisers and communities to scale back activities amid fears of protest or violence. Islamist demonstrations contributed to the cancellation of women’s football matches, while conservative groups opposed proposals on inheritance and family law. Sufi shrines have also come under attack.
There has been some pushback against this trend too. Women’s rights advocates, writers, cultural groups and Sufi communities have protested against intimidation and called for stronger state protection, exposing a widening contest over pluralism, women’s participation and freedom of expression in Bangladesh.
Although terrorist attacks have not increased, isolated incidents show the threat remains. A December 2025 explosion at a madrasah in Keraniganj, near Dhaka, triggered a terrorism investigation after police recovered explosives and bomb-making materials. Several suspects were arrested, including madrasah director Sheikh Al Amin, named as the prime accused.
The real test now rests with Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led government, which has pledged firm action against terrorism, violent extremism and religious militancy.
Speaking in Parliament on July 15 during a discussion on extremism and communal harmony, Rahman said the government would “not patronise any form of extremism or radicalism”, and called for cooperation across party lines.
The appeal was directed in particular at Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s main opposition and Islamist political party that advocates a greater role for Islamic principles in governance, but has sought to present itself as a moderate, democratic actor operating within Bangladesh’s constitutional framework.
Ali noted the government’s credibility would depend on drawing “a clear line between legitimate religious politics and intimidation, incitement or violence”, particularly when politically influential actors are involved or when minorities and dissenters are targeted.
Economic frustration a contributing factor to extremism
Beyond the question of enforcement, there is little reliable evidence identifying who is most susceptible to radicalisation in the country. Analysts say publicly reported cases have predominantly involved men, often young or in early middle age, but such cases do not reliably measure prevalence across the population. Recruitment has also cut across social and educational backgrounds.
According to Iftekharul Bashar at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, educated but unemployed or underemployed Bangladeshi youth experiencing “relative deprivation” – the perception that their education and expectations have not translated into the status or opportunities they were promised – appeared particularly vulnerable to extremist narratives.
Bangladesh’s youth employment challenges provide part of the wider context. The International Labour Organization’s estimates put youth unemployment in Bangladesh at around 17 per cent in 2025, while World Bank data shows nearly one in five young people aged 15 to 24 was not in education, employment or training in 2024. Such widespread economic frustration does not itself cause radicalisation, Bashar said, but can deepen grievances exploited by extremist narratives.
Social isolation and political disillusionment can further deepen that vulnerability, he said, while algorithms, peer networks and encrypted platforms accelerate the spread of extremist content.
Beyond domestic grievances, regional conflicts and communal tensions can also shape extremist narratives. Developments affecting Muslims in neighbouring India or Palestine, for example, can reinforce narratives of Muslim victimhood used by Bangladeshi hardliners.
Previous cases involving Bangladeshis in Singapore and Malaysia show that radicalisation and extremist recruitment can occur within migrant communities, although this should not be misinterpreted to mean prevalence.
However, vulnerabilities exist. Recruitment debt, family separation and online religious networks that reframe hardship as religious persecution can create openings for manipulative recruiters.
Sarker, a 29-year-old vocational graduate in Dhaka who asked to be identified only by his surname over concerns about future employment prospects and possible repercussions, said hardline content had become increasingly persuasive as he struggled to find stable work.
“When I see poverty, corruption and what is happening to Muslims in Gaza, I sometimes feel that remaining silent is not enough,” he said. “Some preachers say resisting injustice is a religious duty and that Islamic rule could provide an alternative to the disorder and loss of values we see around us.”
The sentiment was echoed by others who have observed similar trends among young people. Jakaria Arafat, 35, a Dhaka University graduate who has struggled to secure stable sources of income, said he had seen some young men become increasingly receptive to hardline religious content.
While some police-led, civil society and UN-backed initiatives work with communities to steer vulnerable young people away from radicalisation, the country lacks full-fledged and nationally coordinated deradicalisation initiatives.
“Some (youth) who begin by seeking religious guidance from online preachers are gradually exposed to broader narratives about the suffering of Muslims worldwide, the decline of moral values and the idea that Muslims are under threat,” Arafat said.
Such messages, he said, can sometimes evolve into calls for resistance against perceived enemies, including non-Muslims or even non-practising Muslims, particularly among young people who encounter them during formative years.
Neither Arafat nor Sarker appeared to hold extremist or violent views but were able to describe how personal frustrations, online influence and hardline religious messaging can radicalise their more vulnerable peers.
For now, the picture is less one of a return to the sustained militant violence seen a decade ago than of a wider spread of extremist rhetoric, mobilisation and religious pressure in public life.
For countries with large numbers of Bangladeshi migrant workers, rising concerns over the greater visibility of extremist sentiments in Bangladesh call for greater vigilance and firm intervention where necessary, but this should not lead to a collective suspicion of the Bangladeshi diaspora.
“There is no evidence that extremist views are widespread among Bangladeshi migrant workers,” Bashar said. “A small number of high-profile cases can create a misleading impression of systemic risk, when in reality the vast majority are economically motivated and law-abiding.”

