Moreover, it is ironic to invoke Mongol suzerainty over Tibet, considering that the Mongols, like the Manchus, led a minority government. Furthermore the Yuan, Ming and Qing governments bequeathed considerable autonomy to the government of Tibet and, in return, the Lamaistic religion enjoyed royal patronage. This was despite the high-handedness displayed by Beijing during Tibetan revolts. The writer has negated this symbiotic relationship, which characterised the general cordiality between patron and client states. In former times, Beijing realised the need to court powerful monastic establishments like those of the Saskyapas and Gelugpas and their leaders in order to gain influence in Tibetan affairs. This, however, was not tantamount to direct rule.

The actual control of China in Tibetan affairs was spasmodic and limited to garrisoned settlements. The Chinese neglected civil administration and were content with the appearance of unchallenged sovereignty. Tibet exercised real and nominal independence at various points in history and, thus, its historical status is akin to Outer Mongolia.

In addition, to clarify the British position, China's claim in Tibet was seen by the British as 'suzerainty' like that which China claimed over many contiguous states like Korea, Vietnam or Siam, whether or not it accorded with political reality. Britain ignored the Manchu court's residents (Amban) in Lhasa and successfully managed Tibet's foreign affairs unilaterally. The Ambans in Lhasa were never endowed with the military or diplomatic capacity to defend the sovereignty of Tibet.

The situation is more complex than it is made out to be and one must exercise caution in invoking history to guide the present. The question of Tibet's political integrity in relation to China is a question of profound historical controversy which has enough fodder to supply both sides of the argument.

Sureshkumar Muthukumaran