There are two issues here:

1. Was the fallen branch caused by an act of God?

2. Has NParks done all that is necessary and reasonable to avert this mini disaster?

In the case of Tennant v Earl of Glasgow (1864), it was ruled that an act of God includes 'circumstances which no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility, and which when they do occur, therefore, are calamities that do not involve the obligation of paying for the consequences that may result from them'.

Most insurance companies have explicitly stated in their contractual obligations that they will not be saddled with liability for any act of God, which includes floods, lightning, earthquakes, tsunamis and other similar disasters.

The board, with its limited staff, cannot reasonably be expected to inspect the thousands of trees in Singapore every month. Even after heavy rain, it is almost impossible for NParks to inspect the innumerable trees on the multitude of expressways.

Man in his finite mind cannot pass upon the wisdom of the Infinite. There is something shocking in attributing any disaster to God.

In any event, no person called into court to answer for a tort may find exoneration from the act of negligence charged to him by asserting that it was not he but God who inflicted the wound and hurts of which the plaintiff complains.

The person who builds a house in Beijing with a roof so feebly constructed and so loosely moored that it will give way beneath the weight of a seasonable accumulation of snow in winter, injuring or killing his guest, cannot blame the fall of his roof on Providence and say that the collapse of his house was an act of God.

Nor can he say that since snow is a fact and the disaster is a fact, this collaboration speaks of what it was beyond his human power to avert.

In another instance, if a wind of cataclysmic proportions uproots a healthy tree on A's land and carries it to B's land, damaging his house, A would not be liable to B since there was conceivably nothing he could do to prevent the cyclone or to anchor the tree.

However, if the wind is one which is ordinarily to be expected in the season of its occurrence, a different situation presents itself.

Whether the cause of an injury or damage is wind, snow or rainstorm, the test in tort cases remains the same: Did the defendant do all that a reasonable man could have been expected to do to avert the disaster, which is the cause of the plaintiff's injuries or economic loss?

If he did, he is not liable in damages. If he did not, he is liable.

An extraordinarily strong wind, amounting to an act of God is one whose comings are not foreshadowed by the usual course of nature, and whose magnitude could not have been anticipated or provided against by the exercise of ordinary prudent foresight.

It behooves Mr Mahadevan to prove that a fallen branch is not an act of God and that NParks has not done what is necessary and reasonable to avert such a disaster.

Heng Cho Choon