|
ALTHOUGH it is heartening to note that the remarks of the spokesman for the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) were not made specifically in response to Mr William Ding's case, it is troubling that the views expressed in those remarks continue to be thought of as legitimate.
The bone of contention is the statement that 'As long as a reasonable doubt remains, the accused is entitled to be acquitted, even if the judge thinks that he is probably guilty'. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the only yardstick by which guilt is determined. The statement is therefore self-contradictory. A judge cannot think that there is a reasonable doubt but still think the accused person is 'probably guilty'.
It may be that applying a less stringent test than proof beyond a reasonable doubt might lead one to believe an acquitted person had committed the crime. But how is that relevant? Why should the AGC or any judge think or talk in terms of any standard of proof besides proof beyond a reasonable doubt? The moment a judge stops applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, he stops thinking as a judge.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the burden of proof by which guilt is adjudged in our society. An accused person is given only one chance to show he is not guilty - by raising a reasonable doubt in court. It is unfair to proclaim that he may be 'probably guilty' on some other yardstick after he has done that. That would be an allegation against which he can never defend himself.
Thomas Koshy
|
