First, unlike Singapore's approach, the United States did not disclose the escape of Omar Al-Faruq, one of the top Al-Qaeda leaders in South-east Asia, until months later.

Second, compared with Mas Selamat, Faruq was an even greater terrorist threat, given his closer links to Al-Qaeda. Hence, Faruq's escape was actually a greater blow to the anti-terrorist effort.

Third, such escapes probably did not matter much 'in the larger scheme of things, if lessons are learnt', especially as the terrorists were unlikely to provide any more useful information.

Fourth, Mas Selamat would not really pose a threat to Singapore, given the likelihood of his imminent recapture or death. If not, it was unlikely that he could team up with other terrorists in the region again. It has been more than one month since Mas Selamat's escape. The four points raised in the article mitigate either the security threat posed by Mas Selamat, or the blow to the credibility of our security mechanism.

If we were to believe in the former, there is the danger that we could be lulled into complacency again, until the outbreak of a terrorist incident. As for the latter, instead of seeking self-consolation over this incident, it would be better that we wait for the Committee of Inquiry's findings, as well as the Government's corrective measures.

While these measures might be painful to implement, it is in our long-term interest to face the challenge head-on, rather than to try to 'rationalise' what had been a very serious security lapse, which is still taking its toll on our country in various ways.

Tan Eng Tat