BURNING RAGE: Exiled Tibetans in Nepal holding a vigil for Tibet. Many have become restive because they see that the Dalal Lama's 'Middle Road' approach has accomplished little. -- PHOTO: AFP

The Dalai Lama seemed to lose control over events and had to threaten to resign as the political head in order to stop the violence instigated by the more militant faction. Never before has the rift within the Tibetan exile community been so open and obvious.

The fissure first developed as early as 1988 when the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader abandoned the goal of eventual independence and advocated a 'Middle Road' approach instead. This meant that Tibet would remain a part of China but enjoy true autonomy.

At the same time, he renounced the use of force in order to create the necessary atmosphere for dialogue with Beijing. But the militant faction refused to give up the idea of independence.

Five militant organisations - the Tibetan Youth Congress, the Tibetan Women's Association, the Gu-Chu-Sum Movement of Tibet (Political Prisoners Association), the National Democratic Party of Tibet and Students for a Free Tibet - forged an alliance called Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (TPUM) in early January this year and called for an open uprising.

They declared in their defiant manifesto: 'The 2008 Olympics will mark the culmination of almost 50 years of Tibetan resistance in exile. We will use this historic moment to reinvigorate the Tibetan freedom movement and bring our exile struggle for freedom back to Tibet...We will bring about another uprising that will shake China's control in Tibet and mark the beginning of the end of China's occupation.'

This language was in striking contrast to the Dalai Lama's view of the Olympics. In his statement on the 49th anniversary of Uprising Day, he said: 'This year the Chinese people are proudly and eagerly awaiting the opening of the Olympic Games. I have, from the very beginning, supported the idea that China should be granted the opportunity to host the Games.'

The Dalai Lama tried in vain to stop the TPUM from holding its 'Homeward March'. It was stopped instead by the Indian police, who arrested some TPUM members and thus prevented a clash with the Chinese at the border.

The Tibetans have become more restive because the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Road' approach has accomplished little.

From 1979 to 1985 and from 2002 to 2007, there were four and six rounds of talks respectively between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, but none made any progress. Both sides were to blame for this failure. While Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was not an issue, both advanced conditions harsh enough to guarantee the objection of the other.

For example, the Tibetan government-in-exile wanted its future rule to extend to the Greater Tibetan Region, covering parts of present- day Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces inhabited by ethnic Tibetans.

In his Uprising Day anniversary statement, the Dalai Lama still referred to 'the whole of Tibet known as Cholkha-Sum (covering U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo)'. This is unacceptable to Beijing.

On its part, Beijing would only welcome back a Dalai Lama stripped of his political and religious role and with his residence in Beijing, not Lhasa. This was the way the Chinese Communist Party had dealt with the Panchen Lama, Tibet's second most revered spiritual leader. Clearly the Dalai Lama could not agree.

With both sides presenting diametrically different positions, no real negotiation could take place and the result was a stalemate.

Time is running out for the Tibetan exile community because the Dalai Lama is already advanced in age.

On Jan 23, the exile government's prime minister, Mr Samdhong Rinpoche, said Tibetans should 'hope for the best - that is, hope for a successful resolution of the Tibet problem within the lifetime of His Holiness'. At the same time, they should 'prepare for the worst - that is, be prepared for the worst eventuality, whereby the Tibetan movement has to be sustained indefinitely, for centuries, until the last Tibetan'.

This was perhaps the first official admission of the possibility that the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Road' approach may not bear fruit within his lifetime. This sense of urgency explains the growing impatience among the Tibetan diaspora and may have forced some to consider a more militant approach.

This is complicated by the coming of age of a new generation of Tibetans brought up mostly in Western countries. While the older generation seeks greater autonomy for a Tibet that remains part of China, the younger generation wants complete independence. While the older generation is committed to non-violence, the younger set believes that violence may be a legitimate tactic to gain independence.

The younger generation respects the Dalai Lama as the symbolic head of the Tibetan state and people, but is ready to part company with him if its aims and tactics differ from his.

Thus the split within the Tibetan exile community surfaced in the recent riots. For the first time, the Dalai Lama found himself not in control. He had to assert his authority as spiritual leader in order to stop the defiant young.

Beijing's strategy is to wait the Dalai Lama out. Then the Tibetans will lose someone who can unite the various political factions and rally global support. It hopes that by then the separatist movement would have died a natural death.

More importantly, Beijing can reincarnate a new Dalai Lama, in the same way it reincarnated a new Panchen Lama, thus depriving Tibetans of legitimate spiritual leadership.

Yet the recent riots show that the loss of the Dalai Lama would only lead to the rise of a younger but more militant corp of leaders who would prove even more difficult for Beijing to deal with.

chingcheong@hotmail.com