The Pentagon's latest annual report to Congress on Chinese military power could not have come at a more opportune time: The day after the report came out, Beijing announced that it was increasing its defence budget by 17.6 per cent, to US$58.8 billion (S$81 billion), solidifying China's position as the world's second-highest military spender. At the same time, a senior Chinese official described the situation in the Taiwan Strait as 'grim and complex'.

All of this is grist for the 'China-threat' mill. The problem here is not that China is not a growing military force in the Asia-Pacific region - it is; or that it does not threaten to upset the security calculus of the region - it does. Rather, reports like this are so hackneyed and ham-fisted that they actually do a disservice to the policymakers they are supposed to inform.

To begin with, one problem with the CMP report being an annual affair is the expectation that there would be something new and different with each new edition. In fact, much of this year's CMP report is a regurgitation of last year's - right down to whole paragraphs being lifted and reused.

Thus the same hoary chestnuts keep reappearing: The Chinese are continuing to deploy around 100 short- and medium-range missiles a year opposite Taiwan; they have acquired Sovremennyy-class destroyers from Russia fitted with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (the first of which were ordered more than 10 years ago!); and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is committed to transforming itself into a force capable of fighting 'informatised' wars. We get it, we get it - let us move on.

Just as important, it is interesting to see what the CMP report left out this year, compared to last year. The talk in the earlier report about China possibly developing a pre-emptive strike strategy has been watered down to an 'offensive-defence' strategy. Similarly, systems intended to overwhelm a superior adversary such as the new J-10 fighter aircraft, a Chinese aircraft carrier, as well as the PLA's so-called 'Assassin's Mace' (shashoujian) weapons, receive nary a mention in this year's edition. Presumably these issues have lost their salience.

The CMP report is also misleading when it asserts that 'the pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years'. What does the Pentagon mean by 'transformation'?

The Defence Department, especially under Mr Donald Rumsfeld, had its own conceptualisation of transformation and it was called 'network-centric warfare' (NCW). NCW is a highly complex system of sensors, computers and communications equipment intended to reach down and empower the lowliest soldier on the battlefield and give him the tools and weapons he would need to defeat the enemy.

Surely this is not the kind of 'transformation' the Pentagon means when referring to China's military transformation. The PLA barely has computer connectivity at the divisional level, let alone at the company or platoon level.

So what does 'Chinese military transformation' mean? Judging from the CMP report, the 'transformation' is mundane. For example, it includes the purchase of new platforms such as fighter jets, warships, submarines, missile systems and tanks. Additionally, many of these weapons systems - such as the J-10 fighter jet, the Song-class submarine, and the Luyang II-class destroyer - while advanced for the PLA, are 1980s-era weaponry. Even the equipment that the Chinese have acquired from Russia - Su-27 fighters, Sovremennyy-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines and S-300 surface-to-air missiles - are hardly cutting-edge transformational weapons systems.

When we look at the PLA, what we are really talking about is 'modernisation' - a steady-state upgrading, which is a pretty common occurrence among militaries. This is not a dramatic transformative process that skips generations and achieves exponential increases in military capabilities. The Chinese are simply engaged in a frantic game of 'catch-up'.

Moreover, these recent modernisation efforts do not seem to be 'accelerating' at all. If anything, over the past couple of years, the pace of PLA arms acquisitions has actually declined in some areas.

For example, the Chinese have not begun to construct a new destroyer in more than three years. More importantly, Chinese arms purchases from Russia have fallen in recent years - a point the Pentagon concedes but buries deep in the CMP report. In 2006 and last year, Chinese overseas arms purchases were, respectively, US$100 million and US$150 million. This is a far cry from the US$2.8 billion worth of foreign weapon systems it bought in 2005.

Finally, with regards to military modernisation, the CMP report constantly reminds one that China still has 'a long ways to go'. For instance, it acknowledges that as of last year, 70 per cent of China's surface combatants, 60 per cent of its submarine force and 80 per cent of its fighter jets are still considered to be 'old'. PLA modernisation is certainly making progress and it certainly deserves constant watchfulness, but it hardly demands immediate distress.

So what is China up to?

ULTIMATELY, what is wrong with the CMP report is not that it argues that a rising China poses a military, economic, and political challenge to the United States. Instead, the problem is that it does a botched job of assessment by clouding the issue with factoids, unsupported worst-case arguments (such as contending that the Chinese are likely to be spending up to three times on defence as their official budget avows), and ominous but unsubstantiated assertions - for example, that the PLA is prone to 'misperceptions that could lead to miscalculation or crisis'.

It is critical to note that the PLA takes a decidedly long view when it comes to its modernisation efforts. Its 2006 defence White Paper did not see China becoming fully capable of fighting a modern war under 'informatised' conditions until 2050. The US and other powers should take the long view as well, and avoid alarm or hyperbole.

The writer, formerly with Rand Corp, is a senior fellow with the Revolution in Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.