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THERE are three main factors fuelling Japan's interest in forging a missile defence shield, combining land-based and seaborne systems. And despite the public rhetoric, the most obvious of these is very much hypothetical.
Japan's planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is fairly rudimentary, intended to counter a limited attack by a less sophisticated adversary. The latter caveat means the missiles would need to have simple or no counter-measures.
This basic BMD capability could be upgraded in future - potentially including linkage with the Boeing YAL-1 Airborne Laser and the Brilliant Eyes missile-tracking satellite system, both still in development by the United States. However, Tokyo's participation in these programmes has yet to be openly considered.
The system currently appears geared towards countering a potential threat from North Korea. But it could eventually serve as protection against China's substantially greater missile capabilities. This prospect has Beijing bristling.
Japan's BMD system comprises three core elements: air defence systems, sensors, and a system for command and control, battlefield management and communications (C2BMC). Plans call for a joint research- and-development programme with the US, mainly centred on upgrading the sea-based SM-3 missile.
The air defence systems involve four Kongo-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system and 16 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) fire units. The Aegis provides upper tier mid-course defence against short- and medium-range missiles, and the PAC-3 offers terminal-phase lower tier defence.
The sensors include four US-made AN/SPY-1 multi-function phased array radars, which are part of the Aegis ship-borne system, together with 11 land- based radars. The latter include upgraded versions of seven FPS-3 radars already in place and four new FPS-5 radars being developed indigenously.
The C2BMC requirement will see the upgrade of a system known as the Japan Air Defence Ground Environment.
Complementing this activity, US Forces Japan was strengthened nearly two years ago with a powerful FBX-T radar, a PAC-3 battalion and an Aegis-equipped destroyer.
Japan's current BMD commitment is estimated to cost more than one trillion yen (S$13.3 billion), but this figure is predicated on the BMD having a fully developed capability. In fact, it may provide little more than a foundation for future expansion.
The initiative seems to have been triggered by North Korea's test launch of a Taepodong-1 medium range missile in August 1998. That missile's third stage over-flew Japan, sparking rather sensationalistic media coverage that ignited public concern.
Four months later, the Japan Security Council announced a joint research programme on a sea-based missile defence system with the US, starting a process that saw the PAC-3 acquisition being formally approved in late 2003.
It was not the first time that Pyongyang had seemingly prompted Tokyo to bolster its military capabilities.
Japan launched its first spy satellites in March 2003 in a move widely interpreted as reflective of deep concerns over North Korea, which had announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty a few months earlier and was threatening to lift its moratorium on missile tests.
The satellite programme was actually conceived in the late 1980s and was subject to an internal study in 1993 before gaining Cabinet approval in 1998.
Ignoring current efforts at rapprochement with North Korea under the six-party process, which may or may not bear fruit, Tokyo's BMD focus on Pyongyang is based on several dubious assumptions.
Some analysts question whether any BMD system can provide full protection. Beyond that, there is a public presumption that ballistic missiles are the only way to deliver weapons of mass destruction. North Korea, however, has shown the effectiveness of its Sang-o class coastal infiltration submarines, Yugo class midget submarines and Osprey class semi-submersible infiltration craft.
This second point has led Japan to include among its military's core missions two new areas: responding to the special operations threat, and defending against 'intrusion by armed special-purpose ships'.
Washington's stated rationale for missile defence - at least in its current incarnation - is to counter any form of nuclear blackmail and nuclear terrorism by 'rogue states'. This largely explains its limited ambition.
However, given the protection enjoyed by Japan under the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, neither seems a likely prospect for Tokyo. Japan has no capability to strike missile launch sites and similar targets, but its US ally certainly would in the event of an attack.
This is particularly salient with respect to North Korea, as Pyongyang's most critical targets in Japan would be US and United Nations Command (Rear) military installations.
Political considerations are more relevant to Japan's BMD involvement than the North Korean bogey, though tougher to explain to the Japanese public.
Former US president Bill Clinton had advocated Washington's pursuit of missile defence but was half-hearted in his funding support. The programme really took off only with the arrival of President George W. Bush - and, in particular, former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
This led to intense political pressure on Japan, as a critical ally, to join in. Financial considerations were also a factor, with Washington looking to offset some of the heavy cost involved with Japan's participation.
Tokyo's acquiescence had more to do with reinforcing its security alliance with the US than with any perceived threat from North Korea. The 1995 version of Japan's core defence policy paper - the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) - foresaw an expanding security relationship with the US that was further advanced in the updated 2005 version.
Ultimately, Japan's BMD programme is seen by Tokyo as one of the costs associated with this vital bilateral security relationship. But there is a more practical military consideration, as well.
If Japan and the US are to work in close concert to promote regional security and stability, as the NDPG envisages, this will require a closer integration of their respective defence forces.
Moves to support such linkage have included a major restructuring of Japan's Self-Defence Force to promote joint operations. In March 2006, a Joint Staff Office was established and a major realignment of US forces in Japan is now under way.
The Japanese Air Defence Command is scheduled to relocate to the US Air Force-controlled Yokota Air Force Base in 2010, a move which should improve coordination. Inter-operability between the two allied forces will require close integration of command and control systems.
'BMD should integrate targeting and sensors alike, but we need to cover other areas. We need a common operating environment,' a senior Japanese Defence Ministry official explained to me in an earlier discussion of the issue.
Japan's BMD programme is consequently more about this broader integration to better enable inter-operability than it is about any perceived missile threat.
However, the upcoming presidential election in the US may yet prompt some rethinking.
Among the major candidates, only Republican John McCain is a firm supporter of US theatre and national missile defence programmes. Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama are ambiguous and conditionally supportive, respectively.
November's US presidential election, though, will not derail Washington's firm security relationship with Japan. But, together with ever tightening pressure on funding, it may well affect the future course of Tokyo's BMD programme.
rkarniol@gmail.com
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