A Pew Global Attitudes survey early this month revealed that 'more than eight in 10 people in the 10 African countries surveyed believe that trade ties are having a positive impact' on their economies.

Unfortunately, enthusiasm for free trade is diminishing elsewhere, especially in the developed world. Half of the 35 countries Pew surveyed revealed significantly lower proportions expressing positive opinions of foreign trade compared to five years ago. The largest decline was in the United States. In 2002, 78 per cent of Americans believed free trade had a positive impact on the US economy; today, only 59 per cent believe the same.

Why should this be so? After all, the US has benefited enormously from globalisation. According to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, trade and investment liberalisation over the past 10 years added between US$500 billion and US$1 trillion (S$1.47 trillion) to America's annual income. A successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations would add another US$500 billion. Why should such a country now doubt the benefits of free trade?

The explanation lies in another set of figures: Almost all the gains from globalisation over the past five years have gone to the top. The average earnings of 96.6 per cent of American workers fell between 2000 and 2005. High-school dropouts saw their earnings drop by an average of 5 per cent; and even college graduates saw theirs fall by about 3 per cent. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that only 35 per cent of those with a college or higher degree - precisely the constituency one would expect to be most committed to globalisation - felt they benefited from the global economy.

Citing these and other figures, Professor Kenneth F. Scheve of Yale University and Professor Matthew J. Slaughter of Dartmouth College wrote in Foreign Affairs recently: 'US policy is becoming more protectionist because the American public is becoming more protectionist, and this shift in attitude is a result of stagnant or falling income. Public support for engagement with the world economy is strongly linked to labour-market performance, and for most workers labour-market performance has been poor.'

In other words, the American economy as a whole is benefiting from globalisation, but the average American worker isn't. He does benefit from free trade in the form of cheaper and more varied goods in the supermarket, but he sees no benefit in his pay cheque. This disconnect between the economy as a whole and individual lives is what is fuelling protectionist sentiments. Globalisation and free trade are perceived as rich men's shticks.

The solution to this disconnect is fairly obvious - at least to those who perceive it as a problem. It isn't erecting tariff barriers or bashing China or making it impossible for foreigners to invest in the US - the standard left response. Nor is it to hold fast to market fundamentalism or to cut taxes or to tell people this is the way the world turns - the standard right response. It is what Mr Bill Clinton used to call the 'third way' or what professors Scheve and Slaughter call 'a New Deal for globalisation - one that links engagement with the world economy to a substantial redistribution of income'.

If there is no such redistribution - by expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, say, the US equivalent of Singapore's Workfare; or more crucially, containing health-care costs by moving towards a national health insurance scheme - it will become difficult to save globalisation from a protectionist backlash. An economic regime that is perceived to benefit only the top 5 per cent cannot be politically sustainable in the long run.

On the face of it, there is a good chance the US will in fact be able to construct 'a New Deal for globalisation'. After all, the leading candidate for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination is Mrs Hillary Clinton - the authentic heir, one would presume, of her husband's 'third way'. He displayed 'a consistent, disciplined focus on long-term economic growth', wrote former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan in his recently released memoirs, and one can expect her to display the same qualities when she becomes president. Happy days will be here again, surely.

But perhaps not. The present differs from 1992 in one crucial respect: Unlike in the 1990s, when Mr Clinton prevailed in part by emulating the right and stealing their agenda, his wife feels no compulsion to do the same. The Republicans were politically and intellectually ascendant in the 1990s, and Mr Clinton's policies were shaped by that fact. He was able to 'triangulate' - on welfare reform, free trade and globalisation - and, in the process, nudge his party to the centre, precisely because there was something definite on the right for him to triangulate against.

That is no longer so. The Republicans have imploded over the past few years. The country is no longer evenly divided, as it was in 2000 and 2004. Five years ago, 43 per cent of Americans identified themselves as Republicans and 43 per cent as Democrats. Today, 50 per cent identify themselves as Democrats and only 35 per cent as Republicans. The reasons for this Republican collapse are many, but one of them is undoubtedly the growing concern over income inequality.

If present trends continue, the Democrats will not only win the presidency next year but will also tighten their grip on Congress. Polls show voters favouring Democrats in Congress by a margin of 10 to 15 per cent. If the 2006 mid-term elections were any indication, Democratic gains in Congress next year will strengthen the protectionist wing of the party. Not a single member of the 2006 class of newly elected Democrats was a pro-globalisation Clinton Democrat.

There is little doubt that unless the gains from globalisation are more equitably shared, there will be a backlash. There is little doubt that it is not possible to sustain politically a disconnect between the very real macro benefits of free trade and its effects on individual lives. What the world is waiting anxiously to learn is whether the American political process will throw up a solution to this disconnect without pulling the plug on globalisation.

janadas@sph.com.sg