THIS book is living proof of the old truism not to judge a book by its cover (or title). Despite the off-putting moniker, it's a fairly readable account of how Singapore's public service got to where it is.

In the words of the authors, it's 'the story behind the Singapore story'.

Singapore's experience in formulating policies has been the subject of a growing volume of literature. Already, case studies have been written about agencies such as PSA Corp, the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore and the National Library Board.

Where past studies looked at the content of policy-making, focusing on the why and what, this book breaks new ground by looking close-up at the 'how' of policy-making.

Both writers are academics: Professor Neo is with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore while Associate Professor Chen is at the Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University.

Important questions posed by the book On the 'siege' mentality: 'Has Singapore missed opportunities to play a bigger role on the global stage because of its preoccupations with its physical limitations and insecurities?' On the leapfrogging strategy: 'When does leapfrogging become an escape from the effort and commitment needed to build a stronger regional network?' ... more

Prof Neo, who consults extensively for private and public sector organisations (including Singapore Press Holdings at one point), is an expert in process and change management. Prof Chen is an economist by training.

The book is well-paced. Chapters spelling out the academic framework used by the authors can be heavy-going; fortunately, the authors provide a useful content summary at the outset, so the reader already familiar with Singapore policy knows exactly which chapters to scan.

The writers use the concept of 'dynamic capabilities' to explain what makes the civil service tick. This refers to 'the ability to change as circumstances warrant, and the ability to make judgment and choices premised on certain unchanging values and beliefs despite the circumstances'.

Essentially, they tease out the culture, mindsets and work processes that help the civil service stay on top of change.

Culture is made up of the values and guiding principles 'imprinted' by a founding generation. In Singapore's context, this includes the virtues of incorruptibility, meritocracy and pragmatism. These foundational values created a civil service that is honest, performance-driven and outcome-oriented.

But such a culture alone would not explain why the Singapore public service is able to respond to change. After two years of research and interviews with over 30 policy-makers, the authors conclude that capabilities matter. In other words, the civil service is good at harnessing the abilities of its people, and is effective in getting them to respond to change.

Examples are its performance-driven talent management system and ambitious programmes to get all officers to embrace change, such as PS21.

This aspect of the civil service impresses dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government David Ellwood. During a recent visit to Singapore, he was struck by the 'real premium' placed on attracting and developing talent, as well as the 'real and conscious focus' on training.

In an e-mail interview, he noted: 'Policy ideas are worthless unless they are effectively administered. And many policy ideas sound good on paper, but simply cannot be implemented. That makes them bad policy ideas.'

Singapore, however, managed to come up with policies that worked. 'Singapore has much to offer the rest of the world,' he said, adding that Singapore too could learn from the example of other countries.

Another Kennedy School professor, John Thomas, who is familiar with Singapore, was struck by the authors' description of the civil service's ability to 'think ahead' and anticipate the future, 'think again' and review policies, and 'think across' disciplines and agencies.

One example found in the book is Workfare, which involved 'thinking ahead' of the problems caused by stagnating incomes at the bottom; thinking again by reviewing the anti-welfare stance of the government; and thinking across domains by coming up with a policy that included multi-sectoral help for such families.

Mistakes are also acknowledged in the book: Limits on the supply of doctors imposed in the 1990s is described as a 'mis-step'. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in an interview with the authors, said the old personnel system was 'messed up'.

Prof Neo's background in organisational learning provides the theoretical foundation of the work and enables the writers to come up with the concept of 'dynamic governance', applying the ideas of 'dynamic capabilities' to the realm of government. This is original and appears intuitively sound.

Still, some sense of how 'dynamic governance' fits into existing theories of public administration would have been helpful.

Perhaps because neither of the authors is a public-policy academic, some policy nuances are missed in the retelling. For example, the writers say that the problem of the 'working poor' was surfaced by grassroots organisations and the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports in 2004. This ignores the fact that the plight of the 'new poor' cropped up in the 2001 general election as one of the campaign platforms of the Workers' Party, although the opposition party's definition of who constituted the 'new poor' was vague.

The segment on the Central Provident Fund describes its evolution from a retirement savings fund to one for housing, health care and as a macroeconomic tool to stabilise wage costs - but did not include a robust enough discussion on how this has affected the adequacy of retirement savings, an important issue in the coming years.

The authors' conclusions are most interesting. Having surveyed the entire civil service and looked at the system as a whole, they come up with a list of issues they think pose a systemic risk to the Singapore public service if untackled.

They are concerned about a conflation between the government and the political party, for example when the People's Action Party government says it will distribute government funds for urban upgrading in accordance to electoral support for it.

'Will the public sector still be able to maintain an effective independent voice in a governance system when a ruling political party with a strong charismatic leader emerges who can persuade the people to accept populist policies that may harm the nation in the long-term?'

Another issue they raise is whether foundational values of the pioneering generation can become limitations.

For example: When does the 'siege' mentality end up becoming a limiting mindset? 'Has Singapore missed opportunities to play a bigger role on the global stage because of its preoccupations with its physical limitations and insecurities?'

They also ask if the leapfrogging strategy of the past led Singapore to prioritise global over regional links. 'When does leapfrogging become an escape from the effort and commitment needed to build a stronger regional network?'

These are important questions, articulated with a controlled passion rare in an academic book. But in true academic fashion, no answers are provided.

Excerpts from Dynamic Governance: Embedding Culture, Capabilities And Change In Singapore will run in tomorrow's paper.